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 As chief justice of the United States for thirty-five years, John Marshall molded 
the Supreme Court into a co-equal branch of government. His efforts to fashion a 
powerful and independent federal court often ran counter to popular sentiment in his 
home state of Virginia. There, Marshall’s ideological and political opponent, Thomas 
Jefferson, dominated the political landscape.  
The adversarial narrative of Marshall and Jefferson’s national political battles is 
the subject of much scholarship. Rarely considered, however, is the common legal culture 
from which they both emerged. Understanding the personalities and the decisions that 
populated Virginia’s legal culture from the American Revolution through the age of the 
Marshall court provides a deeper understanding not only of Marshall and his motivations, 
but also of how he continued to shape the legal and political environment of Virginia -his 
lifelong home - and how, in turn, that culture continued to influence him even after he 
abandoned local affairs for the national stage.  
If the Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800 produced a Virginia dynasty of leadership, 
John Marshall can be considered a part of it. When he took on the role that defined his 
place in American history, he had spent more than half his life as a Virginian attorney 
and popularly elected local politician. Yet he was more than just a Virginian who became 
a nationalist, leaving the politics and legal culture of his home state behind. The Marshall 
court retained a Virginian cast, and this explains many aspects of how the chief justice 
negotiated the boundaries between republican political economy and republican law. 
What emerges is a story of an intertwined legal and political culture, infused with 




were sorely tested in the courts of the early republic. And as local figures failed to 
effectively address the significant legal contradiction of slavery, the responsibility fell to 
a federal government dominated largely by Virginians – Marshall included – who were 
consistent in their failure to prevent the transition from republic to democracy and in their 




“When conversing with Marshall, I never admit anything. So sure as you admit any 
position to be good, no matter how remote from the conclusion he seeks to establish, you 
are gone. So great is his sophistry you must never give him an affirmative answer or you 
will be forced to grant his conclusion. Why, if he were to ask me if it were daylight or 
not, I’d reply, ‘Sir, I don’t know, I can’t tell.’” 




In the spring of 1800, Virginian Congressman John Marshall was eager to return 
home. He determined to quit Philadelphia in the first week of May, though Congress was 
still in session. Attending to his neglected legal career at home concerned him more 
urgently than national affairs. Money was running short. Congress would have to make 
due without him.  
 Before leaving the federal capital on May 8, the representative stopped at the 
office of the War Department to attend to some business affairs on behalf of friends in 
Virginia. James McHenry, the secretary of war, was an old friend from the days of the 
Revolution. They had seen battle together at Monmouth, endured the harsh winter at 
Valley Forge, and served on General Washington’s staff.2 In the intervening years, they 
remained on affectionate terms – until today. The visiting Virginian was left ill at ease by 
an inexplicable coldness of McHenry’s demeanor.  
 In the course of concluding his business in the war office, the homebound 
Virginian was shocked to discover the reason for the awkward exchange when Mr. 
Fitzsimmons, the chief clerk, greeted him with enthusiastic congratulations on his recent 
                                                
1 Recorded by Rutherford B. Hayes, from a lecture by Joseph Story at Harvard Law 
School, September 20, 1843, in Charles R. Williams, Life of Rutherford Birchard Hayes 
(Columbus, Ohio: F.J. Hear, 1928), 33. 
2 Bernard C. Steiner and James McHenry, The Life and Correspondence of James 




promotion – to the office of secretary of war! He left the department (of which he was 
now apparently the head), dashed off an earnest letter of refusal to President Adams, and 
promptly departed Philadelphia.  
 When the reluctant legislator arrived in Richmond a few days later, he received 
word that Congress approved his appointment as secretary of war on May 10, and that 
Adams kindly relieved him of the obligation by nominating a replacement on May 12. 
But by the end of the same day, Adams had appointed him secretary of state instead. His 
commission was approved by Congress, mailed the next day, and would arrive any 
moment. Would the struggling attorney refuse this second offer? 
 When Marshall left Philadelphia in early May of 1800, he was a committed 
nationalist, but his willingness to hold national or state offices was always qualified by a 
mixture of personal ambition and financial interests. More than a decade earlier, he 
refused the office of attorney general for Virginia, offered by President Washington. He 
cited the inconvenience of traveling between distant superior courts at the expense of his 
private practice as the reason. He declined Washington’s offer to serve as attorney 
general of the United States in 1795, and the 1796 offer to become U.S. minister to 
France, partially because of his growing entanglement in a complicated land dispute in 
which most of his family’s fortune was tied. Unlike many successful Virginians, Marshall 
did not engage in large-scale agriculture,3 so the outcome of the Fairfax land case was 
vital to his solvency. It therefore demanded his proximity to the Richmond courts and his 
constant attention. In 1798, Marshall refused a justiceship on the United States Supreme 
Court for likely the same reason. And because the justices’ duties included an obligation 
                                                
3 Jean Edward Smith, John Marshall: Definer of a Nation (New York: Henry Holt and 




to travel extensively in order to preside over distant federal circuit courts, Marshall’s 
aversion to the inconvenience of judicial duties could only have been magnified at the 
federal level. It is fairly easy to discern the practical and logical reasons that Marshall 
declined judicial service. But other factors, relating to Marshall’s place in a vibrant legal 
culture within his home state, should also be considered 
 Marshall’s path to national prominence was more indirect than many of his 
Virginian peers. His former Richmond law partner, Edmund Randolph, left the local legal 
community immediately upon the formation of a federal government. George 
Washington made him the first attorney general of the United States. At the same time, 
the Virginian statesman Thomas Jefferson became the first secretary of state. Washington 
also surrounded himself with familiar veterans of the Continental Army. His former aide 
Alexander Hamilton became treasurer and a favorite general, Henry Knox, served as the 
first secretary of war. Marshall’s childhood friend and fellow officer James Monroe 
served as ambassador to France in 1794. In addition, Marshall’s father was a personal 
friend and former surveying partner of the president. In short, Marshall’s Virginian and 
veteran status made him the perfect candidate for the patronage of the new federal 
government.  
Marshall’s absence from federal office did not stem from lack of ambition, but 
from financial necessity. After the Revolution, his father and some of his fourteen 
siblings relocated to Kentucky, where they continued the family tradition of surveying 
and land speculation. In Richmond, Marshall supervised the legal resolution of the 
family’s most valuable holding – 215,000 acres of prime real estate in Virginia’s eastern 




by which point political parties had formed and had begun to mature. Virginians Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison led the Democratic-Republicans, while the New Yorker 
Alexander Hamilton and New Englander John Adams headed the Federalists. Marshall 
sided with George Washington, advocating a moderate Federalism within Virginia, while 
desiring to remain aloof from partisan wrangling. As Jefferson’s Republican Party began 
to largely dominate politics within his home state, Marshall’s façade of impartiality 
became harder to maintain and his national ambition grew in response. 
The rise of oppositional party politics, combined with the favorable trend of court 
decisions in the Fairfax case, made Marshall more eager and more able to participate in 
politics by the end of the 1790s. When Washington stepped down and John Adams was 
elected to succeed him in 1796, Marshall was finally in a position to participate in 
national affairs. In fact, the circumstances of foreign policy coincided with Marshall’s 
financial necessity. In 1797, President Adams decided to send a three-man delegation to 
France in order to negotiate a peaceful resolution of diplomatic tensions between the two 
nations. 
Adams selected a geographically and politically diverse mixture of 
representatives. Charles Cotesworth Pinckney, a South Carolina Federalist, and Eldridge 
Gerry, a moderate New England Federalist, would go to France. The president hoped to 
include James Madison in the delegation, but the Virginian Republican declined. In his 
place, Adams offered the position to a moderate southern Federalist whom he knew only 
by reputation – John Marshall. At this moment, Marshall possessed secure title to his 
Fairfax lands but not the money to complete the purchase. His brother James was in 




Marshall eagerly accepted Adams’ appointment and left for Europe, where he spent the 
first weeks of his journey in Amsterdam, finalizing the foreign investment.4  
Marshall also anticipated the potential political reward of taking such a prominent 
role in the international struggle. Recalling his decision to join the delegation, he 
admitted that, “ambition, though subjected to controul, was not absolutely extinguished.”5 
Marshall’s cautious admission of ambition reflected the prevailing political culture of the 
early republic. Joanne Freeman notes that the successful politician of the time was well 
advised to conceal any personal desire to hold office, because a leader’s legitimacy was 
understood to stem from his disinterestedness – public service should be a duty and an 
obligation, but not openly acknowledged as a path to wealth or fame.6 George 
Washington’s public persona exemplified this ideal, and John Marshall consciously 
attempted to emulate it. And though Nancy Isenberg concludes that by the mid 1790s, the 
aversion to openly courting the electorate was more idealized fantasy than reality, the 
social and political consequences of failing to observe the tradition remained real, as 
evidenced by the severe criticism leveled at New York politician Aaron Burr for his own 
public electioneering.7 
 The diplomatic delegation to France culminated in the infamous “XYZ Affair,” 
wherein the French foreign minister, through intermediaries, refused to even meet the 
American delegates before receiving a large bribe. The Americans indignantly refused, 
                                                
4 Smith, Definer of a Nation, 186. 
5 John Marshall, “The Events of My Life”: An Autobiographical Sketch (Ann Arbor: 
Clements Library, University of Michigan, 2001), 23. 
6 Joanne Freeman, Affairs of Honor: National Politics in the New Republic (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 2001), 5.  
7 Nancy Isenberg, Fallen Founder: The Life of Aaron Burr (New York: Penguin Books, 




and Marshall’s official dispatches to President Adams were published at home. He 
returned to the United States as a celebrity and a source of national pride. It was, as 
Burstein and Isenberg characterize it, “a career-making moment.” His diplomatic success 
allowed him to believe that he might be able to effectively transcend petty factional 
disputes at the national level as he had managed to do in Virginia.8 
Marshall’s success endeared him to President Adams, who offered him the chance 
to occupy a vacant position on the United States Supreme Court. Marshall declined. At 
the personal insistence of George Washington, he did concede to run for Congress the 
following year. Before completing his single congressional term, however, he left 
Philadelphia with the intention of repairing his neglected legal career.  
By 1800, Marshall (like many others) had grown weary of the acerbic nature of 
party politics. He resented the personal attacks, but found himself drawn into political 
battles in the service of his wounded pride, or what he referred to as a “struggle with 
injustice.”9 Simply put, a sense of honor inclined him to remain in national politics.  
Accepting a position in Adams’ cabinet would mean abandoning his Virginian 
law career, but could lead to important contacts and public recognition that might yield 
future fame and wealth in other venues. It represented not only a more promising outlet 
for national ambition, but for his standing in Virginia as well. He joined President Adams 
in the new federal city of Washington as his secretary of state.10 Before the end of the 
year, the presidential election resulted in Adams’ defeat, and the outgoing executive 
                                                
8 Andrew Burstein and Nancy Isenberg, Madison and Jefferson (New York: Random 
House, 2010), 331. 
9 Marshall, Autobiographical Sketch, 23. 
10 In his autobiography, Marshall said, “I never felt more doubt than on the question of 




offered the chief justiceship to Marshall. Marshall began a thirty-six year tenure on the 
Supreme Court with none of the laborious contemplation that marked his decision to 
accept the state department position six months before.  
Relying on hindsight, it is tempting to narrate the trajectory of Marshall’s life as 
aimed toward his greatest accomplishment of serving as chief justice. But before he was 
the towering national figure of modern historical memory – before he left Philadelphia 
that first week of May – he was a frontier gentryman, steeped in the deferential politics of 
colonial Virginia. In that pivotal season of Marshall’s life, his ambition was clearly not 
aimed toward the federal judiciary, or any judiciary, for that matter. Quite simply, a 
judicial career was not an attractive proposition to a Virginian who aspired to either 
personal wealth or political relevance during the last decade of the eighteenth century. At 
worst, the bench was a convenient way to eliminate a political rival – a fate Jefferson had 
once suggested for Marshall.11 At best, the courts represented an ambiguous prospect for 
ambitious men like Marshall, because their political potential was as yet unrealized. 
Some of Virginia’s high court judges, notably George Wythe and St. George Tucker, had 
begun to recast the reach of judicial power in post revolutionary Virginia, with varying 
degrees of success. At the time, Tucker described his role as a judge by narrowly quoting 
The Federalist Papers. “The judiciary,” he said, “has no influence over either the sword 
                                                
11 To keep Marshall from becoming a potential rival in national politics, Jefferson mused, 
“I think nothing better could be done than to make him a judge.” 
Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, June 29, 1792. The Papers of Thomas Jefferson Digital 
Edition, ed. Barbara B. Oberg and J. Jefferson Looney. Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 
Rotunda, 2008.  
Canonic URL: http://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/TSJN-01-24-02-0134 [accessed 10 Mar 2011] 





or the purse, no direction either of the wealth of society, and can take no active resolution 
whatsoever. It may be truly said to have neither force nor will.”12 
The office of secretary of state, on the other hand, was “was precisely that which I 
had wished, and for which I had vanity enough to think myself suited,”13 Marshall 
admitted. The weak Supreme Court and the war department would not have allowed him 
to engage his enemies, but the state department represented an opportunity to do so from 
a position of established authority. 
Within six months, Adams was ousted and Marshall made the sudden and 
surprising decision to become a judge. This rapid and fundamental change in Marshall’s 
attitude toward his public career occurred largely because it was the only national office 
he could retain, and in this sense Bruce Ackerman is correct in characterizing Marshall as 
motivated primarily by political partisanship.14 He simply could not allow the 
Jeffersonian Revolution, with its alarmingly democratic tendencies, to go unobstructed. 
But more than the single-minded lust for power that Ackerman attributes to the chief 
justice made him willing to embrace the change.15  For more prosaic reasons, a judicial 
career was simply more attractive than before. The capital, after all, had moved some one 
hundred and fifty miles closer to home, from Philadelphia to the new federal city of 
Washington. Additionally, Adams had relieved the justices of the inconvenience of 
having to ride the circuit. Thus, the chief justiceship offered Marshall a quick commute, a 
                                                
12 Quoted in St. George Tucker, Blackstone’s Commentaries: with Notes of Reference, 
To The Constitution and Laws, Of the Federal Government of the United States; And the 
Commonwealth of Virginia, Vol. 1, Book 1 (Philadelphia: Robert Carr, Printer, 1803), 
127. Emphasis in original. 
13 Marshall, Autobiographical Sketch, 23. 
14 Bruce Ackerman, The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the 
Rise of Presidential Democracy (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2005), 141. 




handsome salary, and no obligation to spend half the year in arduous circuit traveling. 
Even though he had no experience as a judge, and professed to disdain the political 
travails of national office, Marshall accepted the position without a moment’s hesitation. 
All of the Virginia lawyers struggled to reconcile their private needs with their 
public obligations to the young republic, and Marshall, not surprisingly, was shaped by 
the same impulses. His association with the legal community in his home state 
determined exactly how he would go about fashioning the weak and ineffective Supreme 
Court into a political tool. Coming of age at the time of the Revolution, Marshall was 
born into a mature legal culture. The legal profession of Marshall’s age offered a 
potential source of wealth and some degree of social mobility, and it also provided 
membership in an exclusive intellectual community, as well as a forum for defining the 
ideological and practical meaning of “republicanism” – the definitive struggle of the post-
revolutionary era.   
Colonial era lawyers provided the foundation for what became the Virginian 
concept of republican law. Edmund Pendleton cultivated wealthy and influential clients, 
strengthening the stability of the profession, and George Wythe mentored the most 
important Revolutionary lawyers, creating an intimate circle of legal scholars. Thomas 
Jefferson benefitted from Wythe’s instruction, eventually partnering with his mentor and 
with Edmund Pendleton to revise Virginia’s code of laws during the Revolution. 
Contemporary lawyer Patrick Henry, meanwhile, illustrated the possibility of simply 
making a living at the profession. With continued success, Henry eventually realized the 
potential of law as a source of great wealth and influence. Virginia law offered more than 




As a young Continental officer, John Marshall combined military service with a 
brief but influential instruction by Wythe to claim entrance to the Virginia elite.  
His law partner Edmund Randolph, on the other hand, was born to the bar, guaranteed a 
place among the ruling class by his relation to the colonial statesmen John Randolph (his 
father) and Peyton Randolph (his uncle). Another young man of the revolution, St. 
George Tucker, found professional success only after the war. A transplant from the 
island of Bermuda, Tucker found social mobility through the combination of an 
education with Wythe and by marrying into the elite Randolph family.   
In Marshall’s Virginian legal culture, George Wythe’s tutelage conferred a certain 
legitimacy, especially after the rise of factions made Wythe’s absence from political 
office seem all the more admirable. Virginians valued the intellectual certainty promised 
by the Enlightenment and at least the appearance of disinterested public service not 
fueled by personal ambition. They hoped that Wythe could instill that disinterest in his 
circle of professionally educated lawyers. 
Virginia underwent a conservative Revolution, whereby the ruling class still ruled 
at the war’s end. At the same time, lawyers became a distinctive, professional class, allied 
with the ruling elite.16 In this legal culture, John Marshall and Thomas Jefferson shared 
an Enlightenment legal philosophy, one that provided a faith in the law’s ability to reform 
society – the legal basis for what both men defined as republicanism.   
                                                
16 For the political conservatism of the Revolution in Virginia, see Charles Sydnor, 
American Revolutionaries in the Making: Political Practices in Washington’s Virginia 
(New York: The Free Press, 1965). 
For the rise of lawyers as a distinct, professional class, see A.G. Roeber, Faithful 
Magistrates and Republican Lawyers: Creators of Virginia’s Legal Culture, 1680-1810 




At its core, republicanism meant representative government. Citizens should be 
ruled by freely chosen leaders and not by a hereditary monarch. Enlightenment 
philosophy and the American Revolution suggested that such a government was possible, 
but republicans acknowledged that human faults required the legal and political system to 
protect citizens from the moral corruption that accompanied power. In the local courts of 
Virginia’s individual counties, for example, the law was administered by unprofessional 
amateur judges, who sometimes appointed their own successors – often their sons. To a 
republican, the Virginian legal system threatened to perpetuate despotism and displayed 
the remnants of monarchy.  
The common thread of Virginian republicanism was the emphasis on sacrificing 
private ambition to the public good and the effort to ensure that such virtuous individuals 
could actually be elevated to public service instead of their selfish peers. Determining 
precisely how to ensure the necessary virtue of the judges and lawyers created a division 
of opinion on the best solutions. Virginians saw the potential dangers differently – and 
they measured virtue by very different standards.  
Thomas Jefferson and George Wythe espoused what fellow republican lawyer 
William Wirt called “above-board” legal dealings.17 The meaning of justice and fairness 
was clear, and did not require complicated explanations. For them, law was a tool for all 
republicans. They wanted skilled and educated attorneys and judges to administer 
enlightened law, but allowed for the more democratic institution of juries to counter their 
                                                
17 William Wirt, Sketches of the Life and Character of Patrick Henry (Philadelphia: 




aristocratic excesses. In the end, Jefferson preferred “honest ignorance” to “perverted 
science.”18 
But to Jefferson, Marshall appeared to be in a different camp. Marshall could use 
the lawyer’s “sophistries” and linguistic trickery to prove to him whether it was “day or 
night.” He meant the law could be twisted. Marshall’s law seemed to be independent of 
truth and of the public will of the majority.  
Marshall saw this differently. In his conception of republicanism, law was a tool 
for lawyers to discourse with judges in order to determine the greatest good for the 
greatest number, regardless of the popular will. The popular will, after all, might support 
illegal or immoral action. In essence, the public sometimes could not be counted on to act 
in their own best interests, or in the interests of the republic. Marshall cited the witch 
trials of Salem, Massachusetts, as a warning of “the degree of depravity” that was 
possible “when the public passions countenance crime.”19 The special nature of 
republican law safeguarded against this possibility of mass hysteria or ignorance. 
Jefferson believed that democratic impulses should guide the function of the law, while 
Marshall viewed it as a tool for insuring stability and predictability in judicial rulings.  
The widening factional divide of national politics in the 1790s obscures 
significant similarities among Virginia’s ablest legal minds. In the adversarial narrative of 
Federalist Marshall versus Republican Jefferson, it is easy to forget the significance of 
their shared Virginian legal perspective, and that some of Virginia’s “republican” judges 
                                                
18 James Morton Smith, ed. The Republic of Letters: Correspondence Between Thomas 
Jefferson and James Madison, 1776-1826 (New York: W.W. Norton and Company, 
1995), II, 1076 n.2.  
19 John Marshall, The Life of George Washington, 4 vols. (New York: Wm. H. Wise & 




espoused federal supremacy and judicial review years before Marshall did so from the 
Supreme Court.  
If the Jeffersonian Revolution of 1800 produced a Virginia dynasty of leadership, 
John Marshall can be considered a part of it. When he took on the role that defined his 
place in American history, he had spent more than half his life as a Virginian attorney 
and popularly elected local politician. Yet he was more than just a Virginian who became 
a nationalist, leaving the politics and legal culture of his home state behind. The Marshall 
Court retained a Virginian cast, and this explains many aspects of how the chief justice 
negotiated the boundaries between republican political economy and republican law. 
Though they differed in their application, Virginia’s republican lawyers agreed 
that the science of law could improve their society, especially in their home state – what 
they called their “country” - even after they ascended to national prominence. Marshall’s 
republicanism was fully matured when he left Virginia for a seat in the United States 
Congress in 1800. It guided his political efforts as a congressman and as secretary of state 
and it defined the interaction of politics and law in his Supreme Court jurisprudence. 
New England Federalist George Cabot correctly identified the guiding force behind 
Marshall’s republicanism when, in 1800, when he complained that the new congressman 
displayed “the faults of a Virginian. He thinks too much of that State, & he expects the 






                                                
20 George Cabot to Rufus King, January 20, 1800. In The Life and Correspondence of 




Chapter 1: Virginia Legal Culture from Colony to Commonwealth 
 
 In 1780, Virginia’s wartime governor Thomas Jefferson signed the law license of 
John Marshall, a twenty-four year old captain of the Continental Army. Twenty years 
later, John Marshall was forty-five, and just finishing his first month as chief justice when 
he administered the oath of office to incoming President Thomas Jefferson. The so-called 
“Jeffersonian Revolution” of 1800 marked the end of Federalist rule, and yet Marshall 
would find himself defending his vision of Federalism and Virginia legalism from the 
nation’s highest court.  
 George Washington ascended to the presidency with unanimous support in 1789, 
but the constant political crises of the 1790s quickly divided national politicians into 
acerbic factions during what some historians have aptly termed the “pathological 
decade.”21 These ten years laid the groundwork for the rise of party politics and the 
political-legal rivalry between Jefferson and Marshall. Both men conceived of law as a 
tool to maintain political power, though neither fully acknowledged the extent to which 
partisan agendas shaped legal assumptions.  
Marshall, for his part, obsessed over keeping law and politics separate. His 
version of republicanism allowed him to believe that law, interpreted by the right man, 
could be apolitical. This approach was at least partly a survival instinct, ironically rooted 
in the intensely political nature of some of the cases brought before him on the Supreme 
Court. Where a political misstep on the bench could theoretically open the door for the 
dismantling of the judiciary by the Virginian executive, the Virginian chief justice had to 
                                                




rely on a carefully crafted legal logic that was derived from the shared assumptions of his 
formative legal culture. This allowed Marshall to be an active partisan without 
acknowledging the role of partisanship in the law. In other words, he failed to separate 
them even as he believed he had succeeded. 
Law in post-revolutionary Virginia was not only a question of political economy, 
but also of social economy. The postwar state of Virginia’s legal culture reflected how 
“revolutionary” the revolution had actually been, as the ruling elite resisted the social 
mobility and democratic tendencies beginning to emerge in both politics and law. In this 
sense, politics and law in Virginia were fundamentally interconnected, a distinction not 
always fully explored by historians of the period, and not acknowledged by Marshall 
himself.  
Lawrence Friedman and Harry Schieber note that scholars have used the term 
“legal culture” for a variety of purposes. Like “republicanism,” it is a term at once useful 
and difficult to concretely define. It can refer to a general continuum of attitudes and 
beliefs about the law, a pattern of legal thought distinctive to a time or place, or to the 
specific function of a legal institution. However the term is used, Friedman and Schieber 
conclude that legal culture refers to “living law,” meaning that “if the dry texts of statutes 
and cases… are the bones and skeleton of the legal system, then legal culture is what 
makes the system move and breathe.”22  
Lawrence Rosen has integrated legal and cultural studies, ultimately concluding 
that they are inseparable. First, he offers a clear definition of culture as “the capacity for 
creating categories of experience.” For Marshall and his contemporaries, those categories 
                                                
22 Lawrence Friedman and Harry Schieber, eds. Legal Culture and the Legal Profession 




of experience included their overlapping identities as gentry planters, professional 
lawyers, local politicians, Virginians, Southerners, and Americans. He observed that 
cultural concepts “traverse the numerous domains of our lives – economic, kinship, 
political, legal – binding them to one another.”23 Culture thus defined, Rosen has 
concluded that law does not exist separately. “To understand how a culture is put together 
and operates,” he says, “one cannot fail to consider law; to consider law, one cannot fail 
to see it as part of culture.”24 Because one purpose of law is to provide for an orderly 
society, the legitimacy of law must ultimately be rooted in its interconnection with every 
other aspect of that society.25 For the Virginians, that meant reconciling their conflicting 
cultural loyalties to national and state interests.  
When A.G. Roeber examined the evolution of Virginia’s legal institutions in the 
colonial and post-revolutionary periods, he identified profound changes rooted in the 
legal community’s adoption of more rigid standards, leading to their seeing themselves as 
an educate elite. They favored principles over custom, and they hoped to dethrone the old 
planter aristocracy with a republican meritocracy. Talent, not birthright, should provide 
the republic with its leaders.26  
By studying the function of Virginia’s political system, Charles Sydnor came to a 
different conclusion. He determined that the Revolution did little to alter the class 
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structure in Virginia.27 The same elite planters who ruled Virginia as a royal colony 
continued to rule it as a commonwealth. Even the revolutionary republican lawyers had 
come from the ranks of the gentry. The great legal minds of Virginia were drawn from 
the wellborn. Only Patrick Henry seemed to represent the Revolution’s democratic 
impulse of upward social mobility. His disdain for the science of law and for legal 
learning made him, in Jefferson’s view, a dangerous anomaly. Instead of favoring 
enlightened and rational disquisitions on the law, Henry favored rhetorical displays that 
appealed to popular passions.  
The relative radicalism of the revolution in Virginia cannot be gauged by looking 
at legal or political cultures as separate institutions. Indeed, Sydnor’s political study 
contended that the study of law was the path to political power in Virginia, while 
Roeber’s legal study found that professional lawyers were uniquely qualified to address 
the political dilemmas of republicanism. Lawrence Rosen invites the reader to “see law as 
contributing to the formation of an entire cosmology, a way on envisioning and creating 
an orderly sense of the universe, one that arranges humanity, society, and ultimate beliefs 
into a scheme perceived as palpably real.”28 The Revolution represented just such an 
opportunity to fundamentally redefine the organization of society through law. The 
Virginians had long since integrated practical law with their local politics, allowing them 
to conceive of law not only as a science, but, as Clifford Geertz suggests, to accept it as 
“a species of social imagination.”29 
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Colonial law was a hybrid mixture of English legal practices and Virginia’s 
unique statutory traditions. Virginia’s original colonial charter was just one in a series of 
“organic documents,” as Bernard Schwartz has argued, that guaranteed the colonists the 
legal rights of Englishmen.30 Seventeenth-century Virginians carried their rights across 
the ocean, and were absentee English citizens. National boundaries were less important 
than national identity.  
 The law of England and the colonies was the common law. Instead of a written 
constitution, English law relied upon centuries of precedent and tradition. “Not arbitrary 
power but the predictable and equitable application of law – ancient, customary, common 
law – determined the fate of an Englishman,” Roeber observed. The responsibility of 
applying the law, in this system, fell most often on judges. Opposing lawyers cited 
relevant precedent, and the judge determined which was most applicable in pronouncing 
his decision. Lawrence Friedman describes the common law tradition as “judge-made law 
– molded, refined, examined, and changed in the crucible of actual decision, and handed 
down from generation to generation in the form of reported cases.”31 In theory, this meant 
that judges were bound to decide a case based on a preexisting principle, rather than 
inventing or expounding their own. As Friedman describes it, judges “found” the law - 
“they did not make it, or tamper with it as it was found.”32 This system was 
overwhelmingly conservative; there was little freedom to interpret the meaning of 
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centuries of self-perpetuating legal tradition. As such, the common law protected the 
interests of the gentry and nobility, which suited the ruling planter class of Virginia.33  
The wealthy Virginians, more than any other colony, imitated the aristocratic 
pretensions of their fellow countrymen back home. The built large manor homes, 
purchased expensive furnishings, imported rare books, and sent their sons to England to 
receive a proper education.34 Despite this tradition, the legal culture of eighteenth-century 
Virginia differed significantly from Great Britain. The flow of reported cases, in the form 
of up to date legal texts from across the Atlantic, was minimal. The result was the 
concurrent development of a body of American common law distinct to the individual 
colonies. In addition, justice in Virginia was meted out mostly in county courts, where 
judges were drawn from the landed elite in each county, elected by their social inferiors 
to serve as arbiters in local disputes.  
Sometimes the justices of the county courts were trained in the law; just as often, 
they were not. The men who elevated them were poorer farmers, dependent on the 
patronage of the gentry for loans in an almost cashless economy. Very little hard money 
changed hands in Virginia; instead, tobacco sufficed for currency. The cash crop 
economy created a network of financial interdependency wherein smaller farmers 
depended on the resources of the gentry, and the gentry on the labor of the yeomen and 
slaves. In this social and economic culture, the aristocratic planters and their sons were 
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perpetually elected to serve in the legislature and on the county courts. Here we see the 
first proof of the inseparability of politics and law in colonial Virginia.  
Slave ownership was the key distinction between the yeoman and the gentry, and 
an important aspect of Virginia law. As with other legal principles, the Virginians 
adapted English slavery law to suit their local needs. When the case of Somerset v. 
Stewart declared, in 1772, that slavery was unlawful in England, slave owners in the 
colonies feared that the common law tradition might be evolving to undermine the source 
of their wealth and authority. When the colonies broke from England, they emerged from 
the Revolution with more authority to regulate slavery for themselves, and even the 
federal Constitution of 1787 ultimately strengthened the ability of the individual states 
ability to protect the institution.35  
 No law schools existed in colonial Virginia, and in the libraries of Virginia 
gentlemen, law books did not predominate.36 Virginia’s tobacco based economy 
discouraged urban growth in favor of widely dispersed, river-adjacent individual farms; 
no bustling port cities like Boston, New York, or Philadelphia developed in Virginia 
during the colonial period.37 In the capital of Williamsburg – situated midway between 
two major rivers but not even a port - the College of William and Mary offered education 
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in philosophy and religion, but a potential lawyer could only learn the craft through 
apprenticeship or by traveling to the Inns of Court in England.  
  Just as there were two methods of learning the law in Virginia in the 1700s, there 
were two kinds of courts in which a lawyer could practice. At the colony’s founding, a 
General Court in the capital sufficed to administer justice, but as settlement dispersed, 
royal authority allowed for the creation of lesser courts in the individual counties. As 
previously discussed, county courts allowed local communities to police themselves – the 
popularly elected justices of the peace dealt with lawsuits for recovery of small debts and 
minor criminal offenses and were not compensated for their efforts. The gentlemen 
volunteered their time in the service of their community; county law was not a 
profession. Salaried legal practitioners heard larger debts and appeals at the General 
Court in Williamsburg. 
 As a professional class, lawyers barely existed in Virginia at this time. Few could 
afford the expense of a London legal education, and those sons of elite planters who did 
travel to the Inns of Court did so mainly for social reasons. In actual practice, very little 
legal instruction took place there. It was even possible to enroll, pay the fines for absence 
from instruction, and then receive a degree in absentia, never having attended classes at 
all.38 
English education represented one way for the wealthy men of Virginia to ensure 
their fragile social legitimacy.39 Despite their wealth and elite status at home, Virginia’s 
gentry could not escape anxiety about the security of their social position. Their fathers 
and grandfathers had been the English castoffs who had chosen to settle in the colonial 
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wilderness, and despite all the appearances of wealth in their homes and land holdings, a 
Virginia planter would find it impossible to know, at any given moment, how much he 
was actually worth.40 Their wealth, after all, was not rooted in money but in an 
interdependent web of debt and deference based on the whims of a cash crop and on the 
labor of and equity in their slaves.  
The elite Virginia planter who returned from London with a law degree was 
highly unlikely to engage in the practice of law in the colony. He would consider himself 
a planter by profession and perhaps apply his law knowledge to an unpaid but prestigious 
position on the county court, which met once a month.41 “Court day,” as it was known, 
attracted citizens from all tiers of society and was the focal point of social life in colonial 
Virginia. The militia drilled, commanded by one of the gentry, elected to the position by 
the rank and file of yeoman, merchants, and laborers. Men of property cast their votes in 
elections for the House of Burgesses, choosing who would represent them in the 
legislature in Williamsburg, and the justices of the peace adjudicated civil and criminal 
disputes.42 
 If the working, semi-professional lawyers who argued before the county 
magistrate had studied the law at all, they most likely learned their craft in the colony. 
However, at this time no regulations or professional standards dictated who could earn 
their living as a lawyer.43 In the counties, unlicensed gentlemen could informally manage 
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each other’s legal affairs before a poorly trained judiciary, who were sometimes uncertain 
of the boundaries between English common law and Virginian tradition.44  
Creeping changes in Virginia’s legal culture in the eighteenth century were fueled 
by the gentry’s struggle to reconcile conflicting worldviews in the face of a changing 
economic, social, and political environment. Roeber describes a “Country” versus 
“Court” mentality that pitted the tendency to centralize government and professionalize 
the law against the feisty independence of rural English landowners, accustomed to ruling 
themselves autonomously. When this trend crossed the Atlantic in the 1600s, Virginia’s 
gentry resisted, because the existence of a legal profession threatened the fragile, 
deferential social order of the colony. 
What, then, allowed such a class of legal professionals to develop in the 1700s in 
Virginia despite the resistance of the ruling elite? As the century began, the distant royal 
government administered by the Burgesses in Williamsburg had little presence in the 
day-to-day lives of the colonists. The county courts were the only government power 
experienced by most colonists firsthand.45 There, knowledge of the law was no 
prerequisite, and legal professionalism was less relevant than simply maintaining order 
and stability.46 By the mid 1700s, that goal became more and more elusive as conditions 
in Virginia forced a crisis of identity among the gentry. On the one hand, the planters 
obsessed over maintaining Roeber’s “Country” sensibility. Their superiority and the 
stability of their society depended on the clarity of the social order; knowing who should 
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defer to whom.47  This hierarchy had been maintained for some generations by a 
combination of conspicuous wealth, copying English taste and manners, and preserving 
local legal traditions. By mid-century, however, changing conditions undermined the 
clarity of their aristocratic identity.  
To succeed as planters, they depended on an international tobacco market ruled 
by complicated legal machinations. They could no longer ignore statute and procedure. 
To succeed as patriarchs of their communities, they needed to ensure the stability of a 
symbiotic economic relationship with their social inferiors based in mutual indebtedness. 
The confusion wrought by amateur judges and lawyers attempting to settle complicated 
suits arrested the discharge of debts, clogged the superior General Court with appeals, 
and slowed the speed of business, threatening the make the whole socio-economic system 
collapse, or at least grind its progress to a crawl. For the aristocracy to survive, they 
would need able, educated lawyers to untangle the mess. Finally, the complications 
evident in their struggle to determine the overlapping boundaries of English versus 
Virginian common law meant that they would eventually have to face the troubling 
reality that they were not, in culture or in law, Englishmen. All of this meant that the 
“Court” attitudes of legal professionalism, government centralization, and mercantilism 
were seeping into the gentry’s insular world. Lawyers became, and would continue for 
some time, to be “indispensible allies of the aristocrats.”48   
The economic, social, and political changes that challenged the gentry’s identity 
in the mid 1700s prompted legal changes, namely the acceptance of some kind of 
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professional standards for lawyers. If the planters would prefer to administer their own 
“Country” justice, the reality of their dependence on the tobacco trade meant they needed 
someone more qualified than their gentleman neighbors to represent them in an 
increasingly complex legal culture. The realities of population growth and economic 
demands forced the gentleman planters to reluctantly become gentleman merchants. In 
Williamsburg, the focal point of business transactions, procedure mattered. In the 
counties, where the gentry adjudicated, unraveling the intricacies of debt and land law 
begged for a skilled class of legal professionals. Thus, when the political break with 
England did come, the rising class of Virginia lawyers was in a unique position to seize 
the reigns of power by framing the language of revolution in the terms most familiar to 
them. Even if it did not begin that way, conditions in Virginia made their American 
Revolution a legal revolution.  
A fundamental shift in attitudes, necessitated by economic and social conditions, 
made possible the growth of the legal culture that defined Virginia’s leadership in the 
Revolution and for a generation thereafter. In 1732, Virginia’s lawyers were finally 
required to submit to examinations before they could practice law. By the 1740s, colonial 
Virginians perceived lawyers as a distinct profession.49 In 1748, the most significant 
distinction in Virginia’s legal culture was drawn when the bar was formally divided 
between the county courts and General Court. Thereafter, an aspiring attorney who 
conformed to the emerging professional standards of the Virginia bar had to choose 
whether he would practice in the counties or in Williamsburg, at the General Court.50 The 
legal distinction between the lay courts of the counties and the professional courts of the 
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capital only served to enhance the crisis of identity faced by the ruling gentry, whose 
interests straddled both of the now distinctly separated court systems and legal cultures. 
From the 1750s on, the adversarial dynamic of the county and general courts 
guided the development of the colony’s legal culture. The rarity of trained lawyers had 
blurred in the common law tradition over time.51 The advent of professional standards, at 
least in Virginia’s General Court, meant that proper attention to English common law 
could be revived in the eighteenth century. As the English parliament began to focus 
more attention on governing the colonies through legislation during this time, the 
Americans increasingly relied on their understanding of the common law as the 
embodiment of their rights.52 Thus, lawyers were becoming more powerful just as 
discontent with the English rule was beginning to spread. 
Because both the county and the General Court of Virginia now required some 
form of examination before being admitted to the bar, the neglected field of legal 
education finally received some attention. The Inns of Court in London still represented 
an option for the aspiring lawyer. However, none but the wealthiest Virginians could 
afford it and the profession of law was, for the most part, beneath their social station.  
The Randolph brothers, John and Peyton, represent a noteworthy exception to this 
trend. Their father, Sir John Randolph (the only colonial Virginian ever to have been 
knighted), sent his sons overseas for a proper immersion in British culture and an 
                                                





aristocratic legal education at the Inns of Court. They eventually returned to occupy 
active positions in colonial politics as well as law, as their father had done.53  
The more practical option for a potential lawyer of less impressive parentage was 
to ‘read the law,’ an informal process wherein a practicing attorney took on the 
responsibility of educating a young man in the profession, usually for a fee. Ideally, the 
mentor-lawyer prescribed a course of study, provided legal texts, and tendered 
examinations to prepare his student for admittance to the bar of either the county courts 
or the General Court according to his preference. The scarcity of law books and absence 
of English case reports meant that deciphering the workings of common law would have 
been exceedingly difficult, even with an able and attentive teacher. In any case, busy 
lawyers with little time to attend to educating a protégé just as often neglected to instruct 
them at all and instead relegated them to the tedious drudgery of clerical work – 
especially the endless task of copying documents.54 Courtroom procedure was typically 
gleaned from the student’s attending court of his own accord for the purpose of 
observation. 
 If the potential attorney desired to practice before the county courts, he submitted 
to an oral examination by the justices of the county. (Who, as noted, may or may not have 
had any legal training themselves). If he so desired, he might gain approval to practice in 
several neighboring counties in order to better secure a living. Justice in the counties was 
unpredictable, unscientific, and often the source of frustration for trained lawyers whose 
knowledge of precedent and procedure often eclipsed the judges they addressed. As 
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Robert Kirtland points out, Virginian judges generally concerned themselves with 
substance more than procedure.55  
 Admittance to practice before the General Court, on the other hand, required the 
consent of a body known as the Governor in Council, who were typically selected from 
the ranks of judges or lawyers of the General Court. Their legal training was more 
thorough and their examination more rigorous. If approved to practice before the General 
Court in Williamsburg, the new lawyer could expect larger fees than those limited by law 
in the distant counties, and a significantly more professional legal environment in the 
colonial capital.  
 The progress of education, professionalization, and economic necessity meant that 
by mid-century, the planter-statesman had begun to cede his dominance to the lawyer-
statesman, as Virginia’s rising class of legal professionals used the law to give voice to 
the coming revolution.  
In the midst of these cultural changes, George Wythe was born sometime around 
1726, the youngest of three children. His father was a third generation planter of the 
Tidewater – the eastern coastal plain of Virginia long dominated by tobacco agriculture 
and populated by would-be English aristocrats. In 1729, when Wythe was three years old, 
his father died. English and colonial common law alike perpetuated the ancient customs 
of primogeniture and entail –laws that protected estates from being divided among heirs 
and dictated inheritance from father to eldest son.56 As the youngest brother, Wythe 
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received no share of his father’s estate. By now the law, once a hobby of the gentry, had 
evolved to an acceptable vocation for the disadvantaged younger sons of Virginia’s elite 
families.57 
After an informal early education that included immersion in classical studies, 
Greek, and Latin, the young Wythe apprenticed to one of the rising class of professional 
colonial attorneys in the early 1740s. As a student, Wythe lamented that he was treated 
“less as an apprentice at law and more as a clerk in routine matters.”58 During Wythe’s 
course of study, the Randolph brothers, John and Peyton, returned from London where 
they had qualified as barristers at the Inns of Court.59 After three or four years’ 
preparation, Wythe submitted to examination and received certification to practice before 
a number of the county courts, the entry-level position of the colony’s legal profession, in 
1746 and 1747.  
When the 1748 division of the courts occurred, Wythe chose to relocate to 
Williamsburg and practice before the more lucrative and more professional General 
Court. A little more than five years after his arrival in the capital, when he was just 
twenty-nine years old, he received the honor of being appointed interim attorney general 
for the colony. Edmund Pendleton, a Virginia lawyer five years his senior, temporarily 
vacated the position in order to represent the colony in England. This may have whetted 
Wythe’s appetite for politics, because he stood for election to the House of Burgesses 
before the end of the year, becoming Williamsburg’s representative. This no doubt 
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improved his social and professional standing among potential elite clients of 
Williamsburg. 
 About this time, Wythe inherited a significant portion of property upon his 
brother’s death. He remained an absentee planter, however, his attention focused firmly 
on a legal career.60 By 1754, the new generation of lawyer-statesmen were coming into 
their own.  
By all accounts, Wythe was an impressive intellect, but demure in his personal 
manner. A modern biographer described him as “rather stooped, almost frail, of distant, 
courtly manner, reticent and shy.”61 His legal mind was articulate, but not creative.  He 
was, “among the first in point of abilities,” recounted a biographer in 1836, and “no man 
was more destitute of art than Mr. Wythe.”62 These qualities are precisely what made 
Wythe so admired in the postwar republican legal culture. “Art” was a negative trait – it 
was the vice of selfish, corrupt attorneys. In the colonial period and beyond, criticism 
leveled at the legal profession insisted that lawyers profited from their neighbors’ 
misfortune and created legal disputes out of thin air from the manipulation of language 
and procedure. Wythe’s reputation as a man of principle rather than a lawyer who just 
wanted to win his case was an asset in the colonial courtroom and one of the foundations 
of the republican notion of virtue. His approach reflected the later insistence of his 
student Thomas Jefferson that “laws are made for men of ordinary understanding.”63 
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In his Williamsburg practice, Wythe repeatedly faced off against Edmund 
Pendleton, a superior orator possessing a more commanding public presence. His power 
of argument and mental agility apparently eclipsed the bookish Wythe. When faced with 
one of Wythe’s immaculately constructed arguments, Pendleton “could, and would, 
whenever necessary, tease him with quibbles, and vex him with sophistries, until he 
destroyed the composure of his mind, and robbed him of his strength.”64 In fact, Kirtland 
notes that Pendleton was one of the few members of the Williamsburg bar who 
consistently bested the erudite Wythe.65 A kind, if hyperbolic, reminiscence of later years 
insisted that “appellants to the General Court first sought either Wythe or Pendleton… 
and failing to retain one, turned to the other.”66  
The description of Pendleton as someone able to “vex” with “sophistries” implies 
that his success was sometimes seen as rooted in unfair, unprincipled, and unrepublican 
tactics. This is the same accusation Thomas Jefferson leveled at Chief Justice Marshall – 
that a virtuous republican should be transparent, and able to defend his principled 
position easily and clearly, as Wythe had always done. The principles of truth and justice 
should not require the questionable skills of a professional attorney, who could, like 
Marshall, craftily manipulate language to prove whether it was daylight or not according 
to his own interest. The traditional skills of the professional attorney, long the uneasy ally 
of the gentry, seemed antithetical to republicanism.   
Summarizing Pendleton’s approach to the law, Kirtland says: 
 It was not a rigid framework within which the ambitions and  
conflicts of men were to be channeled and contained, but a 
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form of argument, drawn from statute, precedent, legal  
reasoning, and the experience of the past, on the basis of a few 
broad principles subject to continual restatement and revision,  
to achieve the ends of minimal government and to reconcile as 
fairly as possible the competing interests of individual litigants. 
Justice was not to be discovered in abstract absolutes, but in  
the practical judgment of reasonable men, attuned to the  
standards of their time and community… a government of  
men, not laws.67  
 
Pendleton, then, exemplified the pre-1750 Virginian perception of law - a combination of 
attachment to the immemorial custom of the common law and the relative autonomy of 
county court justice. The unique conditions of the colony thus encouraged a unique legal 
culture wherein common law existed as an admired but indirect influence.   
 Marshall’s version of republican law reflected this attempt to minimize social 
conflict while still maintaining a clarity that would not confuse an observer or a jury. 
“Reasonable men” could be expected to follow Pendleton’s line of argument.  
Because not all men in a republic were reasonable, though, the elevated class of judges 
and lawyers was necessary, in order to intervene when the will of the majority 
contradicted the best interests of the community. If the cunning, artful lawyers could 
abuse their skill, the reasonable judges should be able to discern and counteract it. 
Pendleton had both wealthy clients and republican legitimacy because his rhetorical skill 
did not violate the basic rules of reasonableness required by county courts and 
republicans alike.  
Wythe, for his part, seems to have embraced the optimistic bent of the 
Enlightenment with regard to the nature of law. Though he left no personal accounting of 
his feelings on the matter, his pronouncements made during a lifetime as Virginia judge 
                                                




survive and are revealing. Wythe’s opinions in a number of provocative cases suggests a 
belief that the increasing precision of the profession promised that law could be perfected 
as a science, that matters of principle could be absolute, and that lawyers and judges 
could be trained to determine them.68 His courtroom manner supports this conclusion as 
well. If Pendleton’s nimble mind could skillfully adapt an argument to the needs of his 
audience, Wythe was “too open and direct in his conduct.” In his approach to law, “he 
knew nothing… of ‘crooked and indirect by-ways.’ Whatever he had to do, was to be 
done openly, avowedly, and above-board.”69 He argued this way; he expected the law to 
function this way.  
The Revolution offered the opportunity to draft a new body of laws and remove 
the less desirable features from the existing common law. One of the first efforts of the 
Revolutionary Virginians was to create a Declaration of Rights – a legally binding 
document based on abstract and absolute Enlightenment ideas and principles, drafted in 
1776. George Mason, who was not an attorney, was the primary author of the document. 
His importance in the early formation of Virginia’s system of government reflects the 
republican ideal of the intellectual who participates in statecraft as an obligation and not 
for ambition.  
The Declaration of Rights stated that all men “are by nature equally free and 
independent,” a moral absolute that Wythe later used to undermine the legal legitimacy of 
slavery in Virginia. Edmund Pendleton, on the other hand, was responsible for inserting a 
clause into the declaration that qualified that only those who “enter into a state of 
                                                
68 Kirtland, George Wythe, 54. 




society” possess the inherent right of liberty.70 In a sense, the direct and absolute Wythe 
dismissed the clause as unrepublican legal misdirection. Chief Justice Marshall’s 
ambivalence toward the institution of slavery reflected deference to stability and 
tradition. The standards of the community dictated the slavery was legal, so it could not 
be overturned by reference to moral and legal absolutes. In this sense, Marshall’s 
jurisprudence is more reflective of his background in Virginia’s county courts than of the 
professional standards of law in the General Court system.    
Also in 1776, Virginia ratified a state constitution, which followed the anti-
authoritarian impulse of the recently begun Revolution by creating a system of 
government with a weak executive and court system, and a powerful representative 
legislature.  
During and after the Revolution, Virginia’s lawyer-statesmen faced a dilemma 
brought on by the struggle to embrace the democratic passions of the Revolution while 
maintaining the stable order that only hierarchical deference had thus far provided. This 
was the social and political dilemma of republicanism, and the Virginia legal community 
attempted to legislate solutions by allowing for participation and accountability in 
government while protecting the able rulers (and lawyers) from popular passions. How, 
then, could the law help to elevate the virtuous to rule while displacing the aristocratic 
elite, especially when they sometimes overlapped? 
All of the old questions about the nature of law and the state of the profession 
remained, alongside troubling new ones. What was the law now? Did English common 
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law still bind Virginia’s courts, or was its authority cast off with the Revolution? And if 
the ancient customs and traditions, which had maintained order in the colony for 
generations, were suddenly eliminated, what was there to preserve the order of society 
now? In the face of these difficult considerations, the function of the county courts was 
largely curtailed and intermittently suspended throughout the war.  The resulting 
abandonment of the profession by many wartime lawyers and the inevitably 
overwhelming backlog of unattended legal business ultimately undermined the 
patriarchal authority of the gentleman justices of the counties when the war finally 
ended.71 
The war permanently displaced one class of Virginia’s elite – Tory lawyers. 
Afterwards, only Patriot, ostensibly republican lawyers remained. But men who agreed 
on a general principle of “republicanism” disagreed on how far to extend the urge to 
refashion society along democratic lines. Henry and Pendleton attempted to protect the 
stabilizing influence of the Anglican Church, for example, while Jefferson was 
instrumental in passing the Virginia Statute for Religious Freedom in order to disestablish 
it. Jefferson, Pendleton and Wythe comprised a wartime committee to revise Virginia’s 
laws, and proposed one hundred and twenty-six bills to the state legislature in an effort to 
refashion the state’s law from the ground up. In the end, only a few were passed. Among 
them were the abolishment of primogeniture and entail, one of the most obvious remnants 
of English aristocratic rule.  
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Among the laws not enacted by the legislature was educational reform intended to 
cultivate the meritocracy necessary to displace hereditary rule. For enlightened legal 
scientists like Jefferson and Wythe, proper education offered the apparent solution to the 
crisis of republican law. In the absence of wholesale public education, Wythe had to 
suffice himself with personally training his potential replacements, giving his many 
apprentices (free of charge),72 the intensive attention they would need to take on the 
mantle of becoming legal reformers and practitioners. One such reformer, Thomas 
Jefferson, arrived to Williamsburg’s College of William and Mary in 1760, and began his 
apprenticeship with Wythe in 1762.  
Jefferson was born in Albemarle County in 1743, as the legal culture in Virginia 
was changing. At that moment, George Wythe was attending to his studies, and he 
anticipated a career mediating the legal affairs of the Tidewater planters. The young 
Randolph brothers, meanwhile, were being groomed for colonial leadership through law. 
Their father had been attorney general for the colony, a position Peyton Randolph would 
eventually occupy after receiving an English education. John Randolph also traveled to 
the Inns of Court and returned to cultivate a personal relationship with Virginia’s 
legislators and royal governor as clerk of the House of Burgesses.  
Like Wythe, Jefferson came from a comfortable but not affluent planter family, 
received a well-rounded classical education in a rural setting, and grew to embrace the 
optimism of the Enlightenment.  Jefferson’s formative years witnessed the transformation 
of public perceptions about law and the legal profession in Virginia. The colony’s only 
                                                




printing press, located in Williamsburg,73 facilitated the reproduction and dissemination 
of legal treatises that were eagerly consumed by the rapidly growing legal profession.74 
The increasing availability of statutes, precedents, and case reports provided studious 
lawyers the ammunition to challenge the authority of the lay judges of the counties. 
Meanwhile, the flow of intellectual ideas from Europe allowed the new generation of 
Virginia lawyers to be modern philosophers as well. Thus, as print culture grew, the 
unquestioned authority of justices over legal culture disappeared, just as the seeds of 
Revolution started to bloom.75 
From the perspective of Peyton and John Randolph, firmly entrenched at the apex 
of the colonial hierarchy, the shifting attitudes of the legal culture might represent a threat 
or an opportunity. In the event of Revolution, the elite families of Virginia risked finding 
themselves obsolete, unnecessary holdovers from a discarded legal and political system. 
On the other hand, in the struggle to maintain social order in the midst of social upheaval, 
their perspective might prove valuable if they chose to ally themselves with the 
likeminded republicans who struggled to determine the appropriate balance between 
popular will and class stability. How the Randolph brothers reacted to the changing legal 
culture ultimately determined their political choices in the approaching conflict.  
At age seventeen, Jefferson left the mountainous Albemarle country to pursue 
higher education at William and Mary College in the colonial capital. Along the way, he 
rested in Hanover County, spending the Christmas season with family friends. There he 
became well acquainted with a neighbor, Patrick Henry, who was six years his senior. 
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Henry was already a married family man, and planning to travel to Williamsburg as well. 
Having failed once as a shopkeeper, he had attempted to subside as a small farmer. Lack 
of talent for the art of cultivation, uncooperative weather, and a devastating fire that 
destroyed his home prompted him to sink the remainder of his meager resources into a 
second retail venture and he presently found himself in a dire financial position.76 Mired 
in debt and threatened by insolvency, Patrick Henry finally decided to try for a legal 
career as a last resort.77 
When Jefferson entered William and Mary College in 1760, he started on the path 
to becoming the standard-bearer for the new generation of lawyer-statesmen. When 
Patrick Henry submitted to examination for admittance to the bar at the same time, he 
apparently aspired to “nothing more from the profession than a scanty sustenance for 
himself and his family.”78 Jefferson began two years of general education followed by 
half a decade of legal apprenticeship and preparation under Wythe while Henry applied 
to the bar having read the law, on his own, for a few months at most.79 Five respected 
legal professionals administered Henry’s oral examination; George Wythe and his 
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sometime courtroom rival Edmund Pendleton were among them. Present as well were 
John Randolph and his brother Peyton.  
In later years, Jefferson insisted that the Randolph brothers “signed [Henry’s] 
license with as much reluctance as their dispositions would permit them to show,” and 
that his mentor George Wythe “absolutely refused” to do so. (Henry’s license, still 
existing, bears Wythe’s signature).  Henry’s own recollection of the examination relates 
that the polished John Randolph at first refused to examine him at all, based on his 
clumsy demeanor and appearance, but that the power of Henry’s reasoning convinced the 
venerable attorney of his potential, if not his capability.80 By any account, the examiners 
agreed upon the inadequacy of his preparation and reluctantly awarded him his license 
upon the assurance that he would continue his studies. Thus, the twenty-four year old 
new attorney embarked upon his profession as a man who knew almost nothing of the 
either the science of law or the practical procedures of the profession. His first biographer 
expresses no surprise that Henry lingered in obscurity for three years before attracting 
public notice, and even as he amassed an impressive body of courtroom victories and a 
significant popular following in the following years, he never wavered in his “insuperable 
aversion to the old black-letter of the law-books.”81  
After five years of diligent study under George Wythe, Jefferson was admitted to 
the General Court bar, apparently bypassing the usual custom of practicing before the 
entry-level county courts in order to gain experience before graduating to the demanding 
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professional environment of Williamsburg.82 Like the old aristocracy, though, Jefferson 
preferred to consider himself a planter, scientist, philosopher, and legislator – anything 
but a professional lawyer.83 He engaged in the practice for five years, while also serving 
as a representative of his home county in the House of Burgesses. He permanently retired 
from the bar by 1774, but continued to be one of the most significant and influential 
shapers of commonwealth’s legal culture, which speaks volumes about the integral nature 
of politics and law in republican Virginia.   
Henry’s aversion to precedent, procedure, and the science of law rankled 
enlightened, soon-to-be republican lawyers like Wythe and Jefferson. Though it proved 
an asset in Henry’s preferred forum – the county courts – where the habits of informal 
law died hard. Henry elevated himself to celebrity status with his argument in the 
Parson’s Cause, a 1763 action in his home county of Hanover. The local magistrate (who 
was also Henry’s father) allowed the country lawyer wide latitude to argue the case 
outside the accepted legal protocol. Henry asked for jury nullification in the case by 
appealing to emotion and not legal reasoning, in order to circumvent what he insisted was 
an unjust royal law.  
Henry addressed a simple sense of right and wrong. He persuaded the jury that no 
matter what the statute dictated, even if it were instituted according to every legitimate 
legal procedure, its amorality made it void. Though Wythe had acknowledged the 
importance of moral certainty in the law, he had no desire to allow popular passion to 
decide the law and threaten the social order. The tumultuous political environment of the 
                                                
82 Frank Dewey argues persuasively that, despite some claims to the contrary, Jefferson 
never practiced before the county courts. “Thomas Jefferson’s Law Practice,” 289. 





decade did indeed invite the possibility of upsetting the social (and legal) status quo, but 
care had to be taken to ensure that order was maintained in the transition. The purpose of 
law was to preserve order, not disrupt it. Therefore if British rule were to be resisted, it 
should be done procedurally, so that a stable but oppressive political and legal system 
was not exchanged for chaos. Scientific law offered the promise of an orderly transition 
to a more just application of legal principles.  
Henry’s brand of justice by popular consent proved useful in arousing the rank 
and file of Virginians against British rule.  His courtroom success encouraged his entry 
into politics, and he soon took his place in Williamsburg as representative of Louisa 
County (bordering his Hanover home). But his influence remained local – aside from a 
brief stint in the Continental Congress, he never held a national office.  
By the 1770s, then, there existed three sorts of Revolutionary legal minds in 
Virginia, all of which soon agreed that British rule had forfeited its legitimacy, but 
because of different conceptions of law, offered divergent expressions of resistance. In 
1775, it was Patrick Henry who exclaimed “Give me liberty or give me death,” imploring 
that the unrepresented colony, possessing no power to nullify an unjust law in the jury 
box, should express that legal right by force instead. It was Thomas Jefferson, 
meanwhile, who formally declared independence in the form of a legal brief the 
following year.84  
Edmund Pendleton represented a third sort of republican legal mind, more flexible 
than Jefferson’s abstract absolutes, yet able to curb the excesses of Henry’s populism 
through the “practical judgment of reasonable men.” In other words, republican law 
                                                




clearly required a special class of citizens who were elevated above the community, but 
connected to the community’s standards and interests. Virginia’s ablest legal minds thus 
abandoned their identities as Englishmen and adopted the personae of “republican” 
revolutionaries, though the exact legacy of their Revolution and the meaning of their 
republicanism would not be clear even a generation later.  
 In August of 1774, with Revolution drawing near, Thomas Jefferson finalized his 
abandonment of the legal profession by transferring his pending cases to an up-and-
coming lawyer of the next generation.85 Edmund Randolph was twenty-one years old, 
ambitious, and like his father John Randolph and his uncle Peyton, was born to a 
pedigree of legal professionalism and political leadership.  
John and Peyton actively supervised Edmund’s education in Williamsburg rather 
than sending him to London for the sort of training they had received at the Inns of Court. 
In contrast to the shaky credentials of the profession and the shoddy state of legal 
education in the colony when John and Peyton came of age mid-century, Virginia now 
had enough legal experts to provide Edmund with superior training.  
  As Edmund Randolph accepted the stewardship of Jefferson’s pending General 
Court cases in 1774, he faced a devastating decision. His father, John, steadfastly refused 
to side with the Revolution, while his uncle, Peyton, committed himself wholeheartedly 
to the cause. When the first Continental Congress assembled at Philadelphia in 
September, Peyton Randolph was its president. John Randolph remained in Williamsburg 
for another year, engaging in a desperate effort to mediate between the Burgesses and the 
                                                




royal governor, Lord Dunmore. By the next summer, the governor had fled the capital to 
the safety of a British warship in the Chesapeake Bay.86 
 Into this chaotic environment, a newly minted lawyer named St. George Tucker 
struggled to find his professional footing. He was a year older than Edmund Randolph, 
but without the advantages of an elite Virginia pedigree. He came from a respectable 
enough family, but their prominence was largely limited to their home – the twenty-one 
square mile island of Bermuda, seven hundred miles from Virginia’s shores. The 
youngest of four sons of a struggling merchant, St. George Tucker’s social status and 
financial situation meant that he would have to work for a living.87 In the mid 1700s, the 
island was mainly a stopover point for Atlantic shipping and offered little opportunity. Its 
economy was not based in the large-scale sugar plantations and slave trading that allowed 
many other Caribbean islands to prosper. Bermuda produced little; its economic efforts 
were geared mainly toward facilitating Atlantic shipping and trade. Economically 
stagnant and culturally isolated, it was, Richard Cullen asserts, “a good place for a young 
man of ambition to abandon.”88 
 Tucker came to Williamsburg in 1772 because declining fortunes prevented his 
merchant father from sending him to the Inns of Court in London. Commencing studies 
at William and Mary College, Tucker expected to eventually complete his education in 
England and probably return to Bermuda to practice.89 He received private instruction 
from George Wythe, who was now teaching a new generation of legal apprentices.  
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 By the 1770s, Wythe possessed a new and powerful educational tool in 
Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of England, a four-volume treatise published in 
England and widely disseminated in the American colonies. The Commentaries 
attempted to summarize and interpret the entire corpus of English common law. Common 
law predominated in the American colonies partly due to a commitment to English 
tradition and partly because colonial courts rarely recorded and published their statutes 
and decisions for later reference.90 The Commentaries offered a far from definitive but 
very handy guide for colonial lawyers and judges. While well received in England, the 
Commentaries had their most enthusiastic reception across the Atlantic, where it became 
the standard authority.91  
Blackstone’s authority predominated in America not because it was flawless, but 
because it was the only work of its kind. For practicing lawyers, the distillation of 
centuries of precedent offered a practical courtroom reference. Yet Blackstone’s 
summary was so convenient that those with little training often decided they needed 
nothing more.  
In the chaotic time between the summers of 1774 and 1775, Edmund Randolph 
rested in Williamsburg as he contemplated his political and familial loyalties. St. George 
Tucker traversed the continent that year, in search of career prospects. Finding no 
promise in Bermuda, Tucker returned to Williamsburg, where George Wythe and John 
Randolph certified him to practice before the county courts in April. In May, the courts 
started shutting down in the buildup to war. He tried South Carolina and Philadelphia 
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with no more success, and his brothers warned him away from trying Georgia. 
Languishing in Williamsburg again by the spring of 1775, he stood for admittance to the 
General Court and they approved him in their April session. Unfortunately, that was their 
last session – after April the court shut down for the next three years.92 With no Virginia 
court to employ him, and no more money, he went back to his father in Bermuda and 
soon gave up on his fruitless attempt to embark on a law career.  
That summer of 1775, Edmund Randolph finally committed his allegiance to one 
side of the Revolution and one side of his family. In the aftermath of the Battle of Bunker 
Hill, he quit Williamsburg, bound for the outskirts of Boston and General Washington’s 
Continental Army. Certain of his social station, he hoped to secure a position as the 
General’s aide-de-camp. To ensure this appointment, and to reassure anyone who cared 
to doubt his loyalty in light of his father’s allegiance to the Crown, Edmund stopped in 
Philadelphia along the way to procure letters of recommendation from the five Virginia 
delegates. His uncle, Peyton Randolph, Thomas Jefferson, and Patrick Henry were 
among the Continental Congressmen who signed on his behalf.93   
Before the end of August, Edmund Randolph was on Washington’s staff. In 
September, word reached the camp that his father John Randolph had fled the continent. 
At the end of October, Peyton Randolph suffered a stroke and died suddenly in 
Philadelphia.94 The closing months of 1775 found Edmund Randolph, only twenty-two, 
compelled to quit the army and return to Williamsburg in order attend to the urgent 
affairs left in disarray by the loss of two Randolph patriarchs.  
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 In August of 1774, Lord Dunmore dissolved the House of Burgesses when the 
representatives expressed their solidarity with the Massachusetts colonists’ after the 
blockade of the port of Boston. The deposed delegates moved to a nearby tavern and 
convened in secret. They met again next spring, but this time assembled in the little 
tobacco-trading village of Richmond, sixty miles upriver from the colonial capital and 
away from the watchful attention of the governor. After this convention, the delegates 
dispersed and prepared for war. Before the end of the summer, George Washington was 
commanding the Continental Army. His longtime friend, surveying partner, and delegate 
from Fauquier County Thomas Marshall left the Richmond convention to rally the 
volunteers of his frontier community to arms.95 
 When Fauquier was formed from a neighboring county sixteen years earlier, 
Thomas Marshall surveyed its borders and served as its first justice of the peace.96 The 
newly established and undeveloped counties of northeast Virginia represented a different 
source of wealth than the staple crops of the eastern Tidewater. Like many Virginians, 
Thomas Marshall succeeded at both cultivation and speculation, and by the Revolution he 
was a respected member of his local community. No formal legal training preceded his 
service as a county court clerk, justice of the peace, and delegate to the Burgesses, though 
he was a subscriber to the first American edition of Blackstone’s Commentaries.97 
 Thomas Marshall, despite a comparatively recent ascension to social significance 
in an environment far removed from the cultural pretensions of the Tidewater gentry, in 
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some ways was not that different from Wythe, Jefferson, and Randolph. The stability of 
his community was based in agriculture and slave labor, just as in the rest of Virginia. 
Like Wythe, Thomas Marshall was not a large-scale slaveholder, but his authority 
depended upon a social and political system defined by the institution. More than a third 
of Fauquier’s population consisted of slaves, and any success in land speculation 
depended on an influx of enterprising, slave owning freeholders to purchase property in 
the county. 98 
There is little to indicate that John Marshall, the oldest of Thomas Marshall’s 
fifteen children, aspired to join the rising class of lawyer-statesmen. John apparently 
spent the two years leading up to Revolution studying the art of military science,99 and 
recalled that his youthful attentions were geared more toward political essays than the 
classics or Blackstone.100 So while Edmund Randolph lingered in Williamsburg, deciding 
his loyalties, and St. George Tucker chased the elusive prospects of practical employment 
in his craft, John Marshall mustered into the militia as a lieutenant, a leadership position 
to which his neighbors elected him. His father served as Major, the third ranking officer 
in the company, a testament to his own position in the community. 
When John Marshall left Fauquier County in 1775, he carried the ideology of the 
gentry packaged in the rough-hewn appearance of the frontier. The unique mixture of 
democratic manner and traditional hierarchy instilled in him by the culture of his home 
county would serve him well in the postwar struggle to define republican law. As a 
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seemingly populist sort of gentryman, Marshall embodied the contradictions of 
republican law but offered the hope of reconciling them as well.  
Four years after John Marshall marched out of Fauquier County as a militia 
lieutenant, he passed the summer in Williamsburg, awaiting reassignment. He had faced 
the enemy in combat at Great Bridge as a militiaman and at Germantown and 
Brandywine as a Continental officer. He received his first practical experience with the 
law as deputy judge advocate general for George Washington, with whom he formed a 
personal relationship during the severe conditions of the winter at Valley Forge. Now, 
midway through the eight-year struggle for independence, a surplus of Continental 
officers found the twenty-four year old captain unneeded in the ranks, so he passed the 
spring and summer of 1780 in Williamsburg while waiting for a place in the Army.   
Thomas Jefferson, now in his late thirties, was serving as Virginia’s wartime 
governor at the new capital of Richmond. For security reasons, Jefferson removed the 
functions of government to the little tobacco-trading post upriver. At that time, he also 
reorganized the College of William and Mary, creating the nation’s first law curriculum 
and appointing his mentor George Wythe as its first law professor. Wythe created a series 
of law lectures based on Blackstone’s Commentaries and taught courtroom and 
parliamentary procedure by presiding over moot courts and mock legislatures populated 
by his students. Wythe’s well-rounded curriculum ensured that the next generation of 
Virginian lawyer-statesmen would possess a firm background in the common law (with 
appropriately republican interpretation by the professor). He wanted his students to be 




professionalism offered the hope that virtuous lawyers could administer the laws in a new 
republic.   
While Wythe was training his potential lawyers to be statesmen in the now 
abandoned chambers of the House of Burgesses in Williamsburg, Jefferson supervised 
the removal of the functions of government to Richmond, some sixty miles away from 
the new law college. This physical separation of law and politics meant that to Wythe 
would fall the responsibility of republican education and to Jefferson, political 
governance in a separate sphere.  
To pass the idle time in the summer of 1780, John Marshall attended Wythe’s law 
lectures at William and Mary. In the course of about three months, he received the 
entirety of his formal legal education.101 He also began the courtship of his future wife, 
the fourteen-year-old Mary Ambler (known to all as “Polly”), the shy and unassuming 
daughter of an elite family in the nearby port city of Yorktown.102  
Expectations ran high among the Ambler daughters when they learned that a 
heroic soldier of the Revolution, from a prominent Virginia family, would be entertained 
at their home. Based on Marshall’s unquestioned status as a Virginia gentleman, the 
Ambler girls “looked forward to seeing a handsome, romantic figure, brilliantly 
appareled, and a master of all the pleasing graces.”103 In other words, they expected a 
refined gentleman of the sort typified by Marshall’s Williamsburg peer, Edmund 
Randolph - the sort of Virginian whose gentry status was not only based in family wealth 
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and community deference, but also embellished with aristocratic refinements. Randolph 
possessed “attitudes dignified and commanding… gesture easy and graceful… his whole 
manner that of an accomplished and engaging gentleman.”104 At the time of Marshall’s 
appearance in polite Virginia society as a young officer, Randolph was away in 
Philadelphia, having taken his natural and expected position in the leadership of the 
commonwealth as a new delegate to the Continental Congress, even though he was not 
yet thirty.  
Marshall’s appearance in 1780 defied the expectations of Tidewater society. 
Instead of a refined gentleman, the Ambler daughters beheld a man of “awkward figure, 
unpolished manners, and total negligence of person.”105 At the same time, he was 
learning the science of law from Virginia’s foremost republican legal mind and refining 
the “antipathy to parochialism” that his frustrating experience with the disorderly militia 
of the Revolution had taught him.106 Marshall’s surprising appearance in the social 
atmosphere of Yorktown emphasizes the duality of his social status – elite on the frontier 
but rustic in the old east, and as a republican lawyer, steeped in rural simplicity but 
skilled in the science of law. His legal and political identity as a Virginian eventually 
reflected the same contradictory tendencies.  
St. George Tucker, lately the unsuccessful pre-Revolutionary lawyer from 
Bermuda, found his fortunes much improved by 1780. In the four years since giving up 
the frustrating pursuit of a law career, Tucker reinvented himself as a high-seas smuggler, 
profiting handsomely from the daring enterprise of supplying the rebels in the southern 
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states with war materiel from the West Indies and Bermuda at the command of his ship, 
the Dispatch.107 Even more significantly, during this time he attracted the attention of a 
wealthy Virginia widow, Frances Bland Randolph, and they were married in 1778. By 
marrying into the elite Randolph clan, St. George became a distant cousin of Edmund 
Randolph, of Thomas Jefferson (whose mother was a Randolph) and of John Marshall 
(who had Randolph grandmother).  
At twenty-five, St. George Tucker became stepfather to three sons and took 
possession of three Virginia plantations – “Matoax,” “Roanoke,” and the curiously 
named “Bizarre.”108 His new status as a planter allowed him to leave the smuggling 
business as it became too risky and expensive in light of the British military’s campaign 
in the South. The British invaded Virginia in 1781, burning the capital in Richmond 
despite Governor Jefferson’s efforts to remove the functions of government from 
vulnerability to attack. St. George Tucker defended the commonwealth (and was 
wounded by friendly fire) as an officer in the militia – the sort of non-professional 
military service that would provide a certain kind of republican legitimacy in the coming 
decades, as military professionalism - like John Marshall’s - became equated with 
monarchical elitism and Federalism in the language of Jeffersonian party rhetoric.  
Tucker’s wartime marriage elevated his social status and provided financial 
security, allowing him to easily embark on the successful legal career that had eluded him 
in the prewar period. Like Marshall, St. George Tucker represents something of a unique 
cultural mix, as the postwar period found him straddling the identities of the old-style 
planter-statesman and the professional class of lawyer-statesmen. The unique form of 
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Tucker’s republican law took the form of his eschewing the “statesman” title altogether. 
First he practiced law, and then became a judge, but he never sought or accepted political 
office, as was the habit of Virginia’s elite planters and lawyers alike. The legal culture of 
Virginia led gentlemen to conclude that their natural place was in politics, but like 
George Wythe before him, Tucker’s committed absence from elected office conferred 
upon him a unique sort of legitimacy, as he appeared to personify the ideal of the 
disinterested republican.  
By the war’s end, John Marshall had been to Williamsburg, studied a little bit of 
law under the venerable George Wythe, and courted the daughter of an affluent 
Tidewater family. He was set firmly on the path of becoming one of Virginia’s lawyer-
statesmen. From his wartime stint in Williamsburg until the end of the century, Marshall 
refined the legal ideology that guided his statesmanship. More than twenty years of 
immersion in the Virginian legal culture taught him to defend experience and community 
standards, as perpetuated by the county courts. Given the chance, as when he defended a 
rakish young aristocrat in Commonwealth v. Randolph in 1793, Marshall argued for order 
and stability, and rejected the populist appeal to majority rule.  
Connected to this, a respect for the authority of common law tradition guided his 
ambivalence toward slavery. This support of traditional law over natural law was only 
strengthened by the violent direction of popular passions during the French Revolution, 
which convinced Marshall of the necessity of the educated statesman’s role in curbing the 
democratic impulse.109 His experience in the county courts and the example of George 
Wythe suggested that Virginia’s legal system could be the model for a successful 
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republic – one in which the skilled judge could be trusted to select the appropriately 
republican interpretation of contested legal arguments.  
At the same time, Marshall’s Revolutionary War experience convinced him that 
nationalism was not incompatible with the interests of his home state. The combined 
effect of a career spent as a Virginian politician and lawyer was to produce the fully 
formed conception of the law that Marshall carried with him to the stewardship of the 
Supreme Court. With support from the legal tradition of his home state, Marshall 
embarked on a legal-political rivalry with Thomas Jefferson in 1800 that was rooted more 
in their similarities than differences, and forged in the local courts where Virginia’s ablest 
lawyers ultimately found republican principles compromised by the practical 
















Chapter 2: “Deliver Us From Eavesdroppers!” 
 
Seventeen ninety-three found some of Virginia’s republican lawyers elevated to 
national prominence. Thomas Jefferson and Edmund Randolph were in Philadelphia, 
providing counsel to President Washington as members of his cabinet. In Europe, the 
French Revolution had escalated with the execution of King Louis XVI, the start of the 
Reign of Terror, and the commencement of war with England.  
John Marshall, meanwhile, remained primarily concerned with local affairs. 
While President Washington struggled to maintain American neutrality in the face of 
discord in Europe, Marshall prepared to argue a case before the county magistrates in the 
isolated county of Cumberland, Virginia.  
Court day in early 1790s Virginia functioned much as it had for generations. All 
strata of society were present in the vicinity of the courthouse, where they transacted 
business, shared local gossip, gambled, mustered for militia duty, and attended legal 
proceedings. The county magistrates still presided over their local courts, and juries, 
when required, were selected from among the propertied gentlemen, lesser planters, and 
ordinary laborers alike, based on their proximity to the courthouse at the commencement 
of the session.110 The relevance of county justice began an accelerated decline during this 
time with the creation of Virginia’s district courts in 1787. District courts widened the 
realm of professional law in Virginia by providing the litigants in the counties the ability 
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to conveniently appeal the decisions of their local, amateur justices. Correcting errors in 
procedure and judgment no longer required traveling to Richmond, as the new courts 
moved the once distant professionalism of the capital closer to home. As a result, the 
1790s saw the permanent abandonment of the county courts by the most talented 
attorneys. They could be lured back for the right cause and the right price, though, as 
Richard Randolph’s 1793 case illustrates.  
Richard Randolph would have been a familiar sight at “court day” in Cumberland 
County – a remote rural community about fifty miles south of Jefferson’s Charlottesville 
and about fifty miles west of Richmond. Richard resided nearby at the plantation known 
as “Bizarre,” a reluctant gift from his stepfather, St. George Tucker. When Tucker 
married Frances Bland Randolph during the Revolution, he gained a useful name that 
conferred upon him the status of gentleman and fueled his successful legal career. He 
received three plantations, including the Cumberland property of Bizarre, and three sons, 
among them Richard Randolph. When the district courts were created, Tucker was 
appointed its first judge for the Richmond district. His stepson Richard, meanwhile, 
fancied himself “a gentleman planter with scholarly aspirations.”111 Unlike his assiduous, 
upwardly mobile stepfather, Richard seemed content to live the increasingly 
anachronistic life of the colonial gentry into which he was born – whom Charles Sydnor 
aptly described as “interested in being, rather than becoming.”112 At nineteen, Richard 
married his cousin Judith and persuaded his stepfather to give him Bizarre in 1789. As 
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one of the old breed of Virginian gentry, Richard might have expected to read a little 
Blackstone and grow into a position as a county magistrate in his community someday.   
Four years later, Richard attended the April session of the Cumberland county 
court in an unexpected role – that of defendant. The young gentleman planter stood 
accused of “feloniously murdering a child.”113 More shockingly, the newborn infant 
alleged to have been killed and left outside on a pile of shingles was his own – a child 
supposedly born of an illicit affair with his wife’s sister, Nancy.  
But there was no murdered child to be found. Only the gossip of slaves insisted on 
the existence of the hidden evidence, long since disappeared. And while slaves were 
prohibited from offering testimony against whites in court, the law did allow for the 
inclusion of their recollections in a roundabout way. Their white masters and mistresses 
could offer their own accounts of what the slaves had said as evidence. In addition, the 
observations of the women in Nancy’s social circle strongly suggested that she indeed hid 
a pregnancy, then attempted to surreptitiously procure the means for an abortion, and 
finally gave birth on an overnight visit to a neighboring plantation, accompanied by 
Richard and her sister Judith, Richard’s wife. For months after the incident, the 
community buzzed with rumors about the affair and the alleged murder, finally forcing 
Richard Randolph and his stepfather, St. George Tucker, to stem the tide of the 
deleterious effect of the gossip on the family’s reputation.  
In April of 1793, Richard Randolph surrendered himself to the custody of the 
Cumberland county court to publicly address the accusations. The scene was carefully 
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staged to the advantage of the defendant. No less skilled an orator than Patrick Henry, 
assisted by the legal professional John Marshall, would attempt to prove to the 
magistrates and the public alike (without a prosecutor to oppose them) that the Randolph 
family’s honor was unimpeachable.  
The sensational 1793 case of Commonwealth vs. Randolph has provided 
historians with useful perspectives on the function of gender and race, as well as gossip 
and honor in the early republic. But the people involved, the setting and timing, and the 
issues raised by the case offer the unexplored opportunity to use the Randolph scandal to 
contribute to the narrative of Virginia’s experimental decade of republican lawyers. 
Patrick Henry, John Marshall, St. George Tucker, and Thomas Jefferson played pivotal 
roles in the defense of one of the elite Randolphs in a rural county court, at a time when 
each man was formulating the distinctive legal identity that would guide him on different 
and often conflicting paths toward national prominence. The jurisprudence of republican 
lawyers, displayed at this early stage of their development, illustrates how their legal 
philosophies guided their actions. Thus, this story of adultery, secret pregnancy, and 
cover-up of a possible murder is more than a titillating scandal; it is one of the first tests 
of republican law by the Virginian legal community.  
As the Virginians of the 1790s paid more attention to the political and legal 
economy of the federal republic, gentry sons like Richard Randolph and the county courts 
that perpetuated their authority seemed increasingly outdated and unrepublican. When 
Richard appeared at Cumberland’s April court day in 1793, some of the nation’s greatest 
legal minds arrayed on his behalf. No jury was present at the informal hearing. Rather, 




before determining if Richard would then stand trial for murder at the nearest district 
court. In the meantime, no statute allowed for him to post bail for the crime, so he 
remained for a week in the county jail while counsel prepared their defense and witnesses 
gathered for their courtroom appearances.  
Fourteen county magistrates presided over the April session of Cumberland’s 
county court. Cynthia Kierner, in her treatment of the case, summarizes a complicated set 
of interrelationships in the makeup of the court.114 When the Revolutionary War closed 
the county courts, popularly elected committees, fueled by Revolutionary democratic 
enthusiasm, took their place. The committees did not hear cases, but attended to the 
essential administrative duties that the courts had provided, such as supervising the 
maintenance of roads and bridges. At the war’s end, the courts reopened and most of the 
gentry returned to their former positions of prominence, but a few upstarts managed to 
retain their authoritative posts as county administrators. One such holdover from the 
wartime democratic committees remained on the Cumberland County Court in 1793.  
Similarly, the wartime disestablishment of the Anglican Church, one of the 
cornerstones of Jefferson’s refashioning of Virginia law in republican terms, meant that 
the character of county justice had changed. For the first time, a Presbyterian sat on 
Cumberland’s court, something that would not have been possible before the Revolution. 
Others on the court presided as their fathers and grandfathers had done before them, 
representing the self-perpetuating aristocracy of the system. Though it strongly resembled 
                                                




the aristocratic pattern of the colonial social order, when Richard Randolph faced the 
magistrates, the county courts were at least partially republican.115 
Richard Randolph, though he depended on the combined efforts of the 
commonwealth’s preeminent republican lawyers, was no ideal republican himself. A 
lackadaisical student, he attended three colleges but obtained no degree. A child of 
privilege, he inherited his estate and his social standing without earning it. His public 
excesses and private affairs suggested to his peers in Virginia society that his “morals 
were corrupt.”116 Richard’s behavior upset the ruling elite because it confirmed all their 
fears about the decline of their privileged position in the face of republican reform.117 To 
the democratically minded republican, he personified all the faults of hereditary privilege, 
amateur county justice, and the moral decay of aristocratic rule. If the republican lawyers 
were looking for virtue, they were certain not to find it in Richard. They would, however, 
refine their legal conception of republican virtue in the ways they approached his case.  
It is telling that the men whose political identities would make them bitter 
enemies in the coming decade combined their efforts in this case to find a suitably 
republican defense of a non-virtuous, hereditary aristocrat in an undemocratic legal 
forum. They did so because their common background made them all personally invested 
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in the outcome, even if achieving the desired result conflicted with their stated ideals. 
Whether Richard Randolph was guilty, in this instance, was irrelevant. What was at issue 
was that his guilt had been decided in the court of public opinion and not in the court of 
law. Gossip was irrational, and beyond the possibility of control of an elite authority, 
whether that authority consisted of aristocrats or emotionally disinterested republicans. In 
this case, they shared a common interest.  
St. George Tucker was a first generation Virginian who had married into a 
wealthy family. Patrick Henry, whose bombastic appeals to popular favor bothered 
Tucker, nonetheless possessed some degree of gentility of equally recent pedigree. 
Marriage and family connections gave both men the stature to be influential. Likewise 
John Marshall, the western gentryman who married into the Tidewater elite and partnered 
with the young and refined Edmund Randolph, shared the concern over the danger of 
gossip. They shared the belief, espoused by republican leaders such as Madison and 
Jefferson, in the ability of reasonable men to govern above the distraction of the passions 
of the masses. And if the case of Richard Randolph suggested this was impossible, their 
strategy for victory in the courtroom and in the public sphere shows that when their 
collective status was at stake, the republicans were not above compromising republican 
principles to protect themselves.  
Republican law sought the enlightened principles of universal truth, which would, 
in turn, allow for justice and fairness to govern mankind in and out of the courtroom. It 
suggested that an open forum, such as a legal culture of skilled professionals or a public 
sphere of information, would encourage this end result of justice. In the case of Richard 




decidedly inconvenient to all of the republican lawyers involved. And if Richard were in 
fact guilty – as many of them certainly believed he was – the republican principles of 
truth would undermine their own interests. As such, to defend Richard Randolph, the 
commonwealth’s best republican lawyers had to use some distinctly unrepublican 
methods. Patrick Henry could counter gossip with his own display of showmanship, and  
John Marshall’s legal mastery (which Thomas Jefferson derided as ‘art’ and ‘sophistry’) 
was well suited to a case in which it did not matter whether the defendant was truly 
guilty, only that it could not be proven. Winning an acquittal on this basis was an 
admirable skill for a legal professional, but hardly the goal of a virtuous republican.  
St. George Tucker, as patriarch of the Cumberland Randolphs, supervised the 
family’s reaction to the scandal. First, the Randolph clan chose to ignore the rumors. 
After all, it was just the talk of slaves and women – not worthy of notice or 
acknowledgment. As months passed, however, it became clear that the gossip was not 
going away. Frustration mounted because the talk undermined the family’s social status 
and offered them no suitable means of recourse.   
Richard Randolph responded to the affront to his honor in the logical fashion of a 
Southern gentleman- he demanded a duel. Unfortunately, there was no one for Richard to 
meet on the field of honor, because the rumors came partly from his social inferiors, but 
mostly from no one in particular. One of the essential tools for maintaining the virtue of 
the republic, according to Jefferson himself, was a free and open public exchange of 
information.118 Print culture promised to educate and enlighten citizens and make them 
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able republicans, but it also made it more difficult for the old gentry to feel secure in their 
superiority.  
  In an open letter to the public in Richmond’s Virginia Gazette and General 
Advertiser, Richard demanded that his “timid enemies” show themselves and give him 
“personal satisfaction.”119 He intended to flush out his accusers, but his strategy failed. In 
essence, his enemy was the public sphere itself. When no enemies presented themselves, 
Richard’s recourse as a Virginia gentleman was exhausted. St. George Tucker, as a 
republican lawyer, recognized a legal alternative to the affair of honor. Hoping to adapt 
the public sphere to his expertise in the field of law, Tucker advised Richard to appear 
before the county court at the end of the month and insist on answering the in a public 
forum could not only absolve Richard of legal guilt, but he could repair his damaged 
social reputation. Tucker hoped to use law to undermine the force of gossip, which was 
beyond the control of republican lawyers and politicians. In a stable, republican 
environment, he hoped to deflect the rumors, hoping the truth of Richard’s testimony 
would silence, if not mollify, his critics. Yet the county court was as much a forum of 
men as one of dispassionate debate and laws.  To succeed there, Tucker needed to master 
the informal and formal codes of courtroom procedure.  
In preparation, Tucker enlisted the aid of a personal friend and established 
professional attorney, John Marshall. He was now thirty-seven, maintaining a brisk law 
practice in Richmond, and served as a state delegate. A decade earlier, Edmund Randolph 
had called Marshall “a promising young gentleman of the law,” and “a young man of 
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rising character.”120 Just two years older than Marshall, the more educated and refined 
Edmund Randolph had befriended the new lawyer and took him on as a junior partner. 
He had provided a sort of mentoring apprenticeship during the 1780s.121 As Marshall 
gained valuable experience and built a reputation at the bar, he also served as the recorder 
for the Hustings Court in Richmond (the urban equivalent of the rural county courts). 
There he obtained his only judicial experience before his appointment to the Supreme 
Court at the end of the century.122 When Patrick Henry completed his second non-
consecutive term as Virginia governor in 1786, Edmund Randolph replaced him and 
turned over the rest of the law practice to Marshall. By the middle of the 1780s, Marshall 
had as many clients as he could manage, and success in the legal profession encouraged 
his appetite for political recognition.123 
Edmund Randolph vacated the post of Virginia attorney general when he accepted 
the governorship, and Marshall narrowly failed in his attempt to succeed him. The post 
was won by James Innes, who shared with Marshall the distinction of being a veteran of 
the Revolution, student of George Wythe, and a state delegate. The following year, 
Randolph headed the Virginia delegation at the Constitutional Convention in 
Philadelphia, where he warned the assembly, “Our chief danger arises from the 
democratic parts of our [state] constitutions.” He further warned against “the powers of 
government exercised by the people swallow[ing] up the other branches. None of the 
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[state] constitutions have provided sufficient checks against… democracy.”124 Though 
Thomas Jefferson was overseas as ambassador to France at the time of the convention, he 
previously expressed agreement with Randolph’s assessment in his Notes on the State of 
Virginia. Virginia’s Constitution, Jefferson insisted, contained “very capital defects,”125 
born of the democratic impulses of the early days of the Revolution. The defective nature 
of Virginia’s constitution, in Jefferson’s estimation, was the overwhelming primacy of 
the legislature over the other two branches, and the failure to delineate any substantive 
differences between the upper and the lower houses. One body of electors chose 
Virginia’s Senate and House of Representatives, and did so at the same time, making the 
executive weak and the judiciary impotent and subservient to the popular will.126  
Criticizing the Revolutionary constitution of Virginia in republican legal and political 
terms, Jefferson strongly implied that an independent judiciary was necessary for the 
successful application of republican law.  
St. George Tucker agreed and expanded on Jefferson’s reasoning, specifying the 
unrepublican characteristics of Virginia’s courts and offering solutions. First and 
foremost, Tucker expressed amazement that the state’s constitution did not prohibit 
county court justices from also serving as legislators. Operating concurrently as two 
branches of government, “these members unite in their own persons such a variety of 
powers as appears perfectly incompatible with the principles of a democracy.”127 For 
Tucker, democracy gave republican law its basis for legitimacy, but was vulnerable to 
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exploitation by interested, unrepublican aristocrats. The opportunity they possessed to 
both legislate and adjudicate in their communities allowed for what Tucker derided as an 
“elective aristocracy” – elite rule hidden in the guise of democracy. And as Tucker had 
already observed in the function of the county courts, this self-perpetuating power 
structure amounted to “a hereditary aristocracy, in fact.”128 Simply put, judges could not 
also be legislators. This logic informed Tucker’s eventual reasoning in confronting the 
problem of slavery in the republic, as he rejected the practice of judge-made law. The 
legislature had clearly protected slavery with all of their laws, and as a republican judge, 
Tucker felt he was bound by their intentions and not his own. He could enforce the 
abolition of slavery if it became the law of the land, but he would not allow himself to 
broadly interpret the existing laws to suit his own preference (as George Wythe 
eventually chose to do).  
Tucker’s proposed solution to the corruption of the county courts was simple 
enough - pay the judges. Presently, the elite status of the county magistrates allowed them 
the luxury of volunteering their time. Tucker, an educated, salaried district court judge, 
wondered how services, “gratuitously rendered,” could possibly be performed with “the 
same diligence, punctuality, or even ability, as where they meet with due compensation 
and encouragement.”129 
When Virginia legislators proposed that the old professional divisions between 
the county and general courts be abolished, Thomas Jefferson balked at the suggestion. 
He wrote to George Wythe: “I think the bar of the general court a proper and an excellent 
nursery for future judges if it be so regulated as that science may be encouraged and may 
                                                





live there. But this can never be if an inundation of insects is permitted to come from the 
county courts and consume the harvest.”130 Thus the rural courts were not just 
unrepublican - they devoured virtue like a biblical plague. At the general court and at the 
College of William and Mary, Jefferson and Wythe could control the standards of 
republican law and cultivate virtuous republican judges. In the intellectual wilderness of 
the counties, they had no hope of displacing the elected aristocracy. In Jefferson’s 
estimation, it was better to keep them separate than to contaminate the higher court with 
the dregs from below. Throughout the 1780s, Virginia’s republican politicians 
experimented, with little success, at ways to reform the problematic county courts. In 
1785 James Madison expressed disillusionment at the continual failure of legislative 
reform attempts. “The experiment,” he said, “has demonstrated the impracticability of 
rendering these Courts fit instruments of Justice.”131  
Though Jefferson and Tucker alike extolled the virtues of an independent 
judiciary and a legal culture of enlightened reason, their common interest in the Randolph 
scandal prompted them to embrace a forum that encouraged neither. Tucker did not count 
on the expertise of disinterested judges to clear his stepson’s name, nor did his legal team 
seek to reveal a factual truth so that reason could dictate justice. The good standing of the 
Randolph name was at stake, an issue that directly affected St. George Tucker, whose 
stepson stood accused, and Thomas Jefferson, whose daughter had married into the 
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family. In this case, the “elective aristocracy” which both men feared would serve their 
needs well enough. 
The 1780s had ended with the adoption of a Federal Constitution, and John 
Marshall, though a newcomer to Virginia politics, distinguished himself in his arguments 
for ratification. George Wythe lent his prestige to the cause, while Patrick Henry argued 
against the Constitution with all the Revolutionary zeal he could muster. St. George 
Tucker was, like Marshall, still in the process of establishing his professional footing. In 
1787, his efforts were directed more to his local practice and his plantations than to 
political affairs. Tucker was not present at the Philadelphia Convention and was occupied 
with the business of court proceedings during Richmond’s ratification debates. As a 
politically aware Virginian, he first feared the consequences of the proposed Constitution 
(“replete with danger,”132 he called it), but ultimately decided to support ratification. 
Once passed, Tucker stated in no uncertain terms, its authority was binding and complete. 
“Hence every attempt in any government to change the constitution (otherwise than in the 
mode which the constitution may prescribe) is in fact a subversion of the foundations of 
its own authority.”133 
Of the young lawyers who had come of age during the Revolution, only Edmund 
Randolph occupied a position on the national stage, befitting his family’s long tradition 
of leadership. Randolph, having refused to sign the Constitution in Philadelphia, 
surprised its antifederalist opponents by campaigning for ratification back home in 
Virginia. Ultimately, he disapproved of it, but he found the prospect of Patrick Henry’s 
brand of democracy more threatening than the shortcomings of the proposed federal 
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government.134 Like his long absent Loyalist father, Edmund Randolph had a tendency, 
irritating to impatient partisans, to appear noncommittal while stalling for time in 
quixotic hopes for compromise. As the nation’s first attorney general, this trait only 
exacerbated the annoyance of Secretary of State Jefferson and Treasurer Alexander 
Hamilton. In the relentless political battle between the other two members of President 
Washington’s cabinet, Randolph refused to always side with his fellow Virginian. 
Jefferson complained that he was “the poorest chameleon I ever saw, having no color of 
his own and reflecting that nearest him. When he is with me, he is a whig. When with 
Hamilton, he is a tory. When with the president, he is that [which] he thinks will please 
him.”135 In truth, Randolph was a balanced politician who, in attempting to negotiate the 
middle ground between two violently opposed factions, drew the ire of both. Like his 
Loyalist father, his conciliatory nature was unwelcome in a time of passionate political 
upheaval.  
Patrick Henry, while hardly magnanimous in defeat, declared after ratification 
that he would be “a peaceable citizen,” and would “retrieve the loss of liberty, and 
remove the defects of that system, in a constitutional way.”136 If he did not like the 
product, he, like St. George Tucker, at least believed it provided the means for self-
correction.  
George Wythe, now more than sixty-years old, presently began a new phase of his 
life. He left the College of William and Mary to accept a position in Richmond as a judge 
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of the Chancery Court. St. George Tucker’s district court was a court of law, meaning it 
heard cases according to the established procedures and precedents of the common law.  
Wythe’s court, on the other hand, was a court of equity. Expressed in the simplest terms, 
equity law, practiced in the Chancery Court, allowed for adjudication where no remedy 
existed in the procedure of common law, or where the strict application of the common 
law was clearly unfair or impossible under unusual circumstances. Conditions unique to 
the Virginian environment – slavery disputes, for example – found English common law 
often silent or its principles problematic.137 Equity made the law adaptable, by 
acknowledging that the pure language of law could not be brought to bear on every 
situation and providing an alternative forum. There was no jury in the Chancery Court, 
just a presiding judge with the old English title of “Chancellor,” an educated professional 
responsible for administering flexible justice based on a sense of fairness where law fell 
short. In 1789, George Wythe’s responsibility thus shifted from instructing his students in 
Blackstone’s timeless principles and precedents, to deciding those unique cases where 
their application was impossible.  
The honor of replacing Wythe as the commonwealth’s law professor – the 
guarantor of republican legal virtue – fell to Richmond’s new district judge, St. George 
Tucker. Tucker relocated to the vicinity of William and Mary, where he took on the 
stressful task of balancing his duties at the Richmond court and attending to his students 
in Williamsburg. 
 Four years later, Tucker’s busy schedule was interrupted by the extended visit of 
his beleaguered stepson. Richard Randolph stayed in Tucker’s Williamsburg home for 
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much of the winter and spring of 1793, as they contemplated their response to the rumors 
that had spread well beyond Richard’s isolated Cumberland community. 
Tucker was determined to use the forum to the county court to benefit Richard by 
creating the illusion of an open, republican forum and the impartial administration of 
justice. Republican lawyers would speak to the legal profession and the public alike, 
giving the appearance that justice was served. In reality, Tucker carefully constructed the 
proceedings to be weighted in his favor. First, his stepson would appear not before a jury, 
but rather an informal hearing of his social peers. No legal professional would oppose 
him – there was no prosecutor to refute the arguments of his legal team. But, surprisingly, 
they planned to use a familiar set of legal ruses in defense of Richard. Henry would fight 
fire with fire, using gossip to undermine gossip (rather than rising above it), and Marshall 
would base his defense on a legal construction (the absence of a body) to win acquittal 
without regard to the actual guilt or innocence of his client.  
Republican “justice” was not Tucker’s goal, success on his own terms was. 
Madison had worried that the county courts could not be reformed – that they would 
never be instruments of republican justice. And Jefferson worried of the corrosive effect 
that participating in the unfit system would have on proper republican lawyers. Tucker’s 
manipulation of the proceedings for his family’s interest, though it benefitted all the 
republicans involved, appears to validate Madison and Jefferson’s concerns. In one of the 
first significant tests of republican principles in the Virginian legal community, the idea 
of republican law was severely tested and sorely compromised.  
The stakes were high, so Tucker promptly contacted John Marshall, though his 




court. Marshall excelled at civil law – land disputes, contracts, writs and wills – the kinds 
of cases that required navigating the complicated machinations of statute and procedure. 
In his entire legal career, he only took on three or four criminal cases.138 Criminal law, 
excepting capital offenses, was practiced mostly at the county level, where lawyers of 
talent rarely remained. Smaller fees deterred more professional lawyers, and men like 
Marshall facing the typical county judge often spoke a different legal language. William 
Wirt, the future U.S. attorney general, humorously confessed that an ambitious lawyer in 
a Virginia county court risked feeling “like a seventy-four gun ship aground in a creek; 
while every pettifogger, with his canoe and paddle was able to glide around and get 
ahead.”139 So although Marshall’s skill was unquestioned, and though he had observed 
county justice as recorder of the Hustings Court in Richmond, his practical experience as 
a criminal lawyer was limited. As noted before, the county courts were not just forums of 
law, but theaters as well. And this case, orchestrated as an appeal to the public 
consciousness, demanded something more than a skillful legal argument. Marshall 
probably could have convinced the magistrates of Richard Randolph’s innocence on the 
basis of there being no body. But Richard Randolph and St. George Tucker needed to 
convince the public as well. That is why Tucker recruited Henry, the most popular orator 
in Virginia.140  
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More than prove there was no body and therefore no crime, Marshall and Henry 
attacked the hearsay evidence of slaves. Marshall applied a similar line of logic when he 
presided over the treason trial of Aaron Burr in 1807. In that case, Jefferson was 
confident that the public sphere had made the right determination – the rumor and gossip 
surrounding Aaron Burr’s plot had convicted him in the court of public opinion, and 
Jefferson was comfortable with the verdict.141 And while Burr’s prosecution did not rely 
on secondhand testimony from slaves, Marshall ultimately reached a similar conclusion 
in both cases – that “justice” required a high standard of transparency and rational experts 
to evaluate the evidence.  
Despite his personal aversion to Henry’s politics and personality, Tucker 
recognized that he needed him. As Thomas Jefferson once predicted, the most capable 
lawyers (“men of science”) had long since fled the amateur courts. Jefferson worried that 
the nature of county justice would undermine the whole system of republican law, 
because while the quality of rural attorneys declined, the volume of adjudication did not. 
Significant cases would still be heard in the counties, and Jefferson accurately perceived 
that difficult disputes would suffer when subjected to the arbitrary nature of county 
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the Papers of John Marshall, makes no conclusive judgment on whether Marshall argued 
before the court. He does, however, assert that circumstantial evidence persuasively 
determines that Marshall was at least present at Richard’s examination before the 
Cumberland County Court on April 29, 1793, a conclusion accepted by all of Marshall’s 
biographers. Ultimately, however, knowing Marshall’s precise function in the court 
proceedings is not necessary for analyzing the significance of his participation. 




justice. As in this case, rural Virginians imported republican lawyers to represent them in 
county courts when the stakes were high enough. “Men of science then (if there were to 
be any),” Jefferson warned, “would only be employed as auxiliary counsel in difficult 
cases. But can they live by that? Certainly not.” Financial pressure, then, threatened to 
lure republican lawyers to act as “marauder[s] in the county courts,” Jefferson feared, 
distracting them from their studies. In this case, few lawyers would “have the leisure to 
acquire science.” 142 The entire profession would suffer.   
Patrick Henry personified Jefferson’s fears. He had amassed a tidy fortune and 
immeasurable fame in practicing before both the county and general courts, without 
finding the time to acquire the science of law. Henry’s appeal was purely popular. His 
emotional method might sway the judges, especially with Marshall’s professional 
oversight, but his flair for the dramatic was aimed squarely at those invisible enemies that 
Richard Randolph could not meet on the field of honor. Henry spoke to the people, and it 
was the people who were undermining the reputations of Randolph and Tucker. 
Patrick Henry’s efforts addressed the case’s other purpose – undermining the 
leveling effect of gossip. The testimony of Mary Cary Page, Nancy’s aunt, was the only 
conclusive eyewitness account that Nancy had actually been pregnant at all. Page stated 
she had observed Nancy, in passing, “through a crack” in a door. In her state of undress, 
Nancy appeared to be pregnant. Henry apparently responded by mockingly asking the 
witness to specify, “which eye did you peep with?” Henry completed his theatrical 
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performance by turning from the agitated witness to the magistrates and crying out, 
“Great God, deliver us from eavesdroppers!”143  
Henry had not disproved Mary Page’s assertion, but he had publicly discredited 
her. Highlighting her voyeurism turned her into a snoop – the satirical embodiment of 
female gossip. Henry made her testimony seem ridiculous in spite of the fact that it may 
well have been true. Truth, in the republican public forum, was supposed to facilitate 
justice. But Mary Page’s method was tainted, making her information less reliable. If the 
public sphere was a place where transparency ruled, a nosy busybody had no place in it.  
When all of the testimony was completed, the judges, without retiring to 
deliberate, declared Richard Randolph innocent and ordered his release. Though the 
magistrates responded favorably, the people did not. Martha Jefferson Randolph told to 
her father soon after the dismissal that “only a small part of the world and those the most 
inconsiderate people in it were influenced in there [sic] opinion by the dicision [sic] of 
the court.”144 
It is worth noting that neither Marshall nor Henry offered any personal defense of 
Richard Randolph. The evidence indicates that his neighbors in Cumberland County had 
judged him to be immoral even before the scandal with his wife’s sister, though their 
correspondence does not specify his misdeeds. Richard’s best hope for redemption lay in 
his association with St. George Tucker and gaining the support of the leading men of the 
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bar. Ironically, it was Tucker’s spotless reputation as a judge and the law professor at 
William and Mary that was the only hope for salvaging the Randolph name. 
George Wythe had mentored Thomas Jefferson, who had in turn taken on the 
responsibility of guiding James Monroe and William Wirt; personal relationships based 
on the idea that mentorship and education could confer merit from one generation to the 
next in place of the old ties of kinship. Tucker was doing the same in his role as professor 
at William and Mary, but he found a difficult challenge with his wife’s son.145 
 Republican law was still the province of elite lawyers, but the community judged 
cases by different standards. Common law form and precedent still guided the function of 
Virginia’s justice system. How to cultivate republican virtue and how republican 
principles should be applied was still unclear, and even Jefferson had difficulty drawing 
the boundaries. “State a moral case to a ploughman and a professor,” he theorized, and 
“the former will decide as well, and often better than the latter, because he has not been 
led astray by artificial rules.”146 The county courts, of course, were just the sort of forum 
where artificial rules did not decide the merits of a case. 
 Jefferson’s solution was education. Instead of encouraging a new generation of 
republican lawyers to focus on the rigid function of statutes and precedents, Jefferson 
attempted to create a public education system to encourage a virtuous pool of talented 
men to adjudicate the law. Planter elites would not rule courts, and neither would the 
amateurs.  
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 “Laws are made for men of ordinary understanding,” Jefferson insisted, “and 
should, therefore, be construed by the ordinary rules of common sense. Their meaning is 
not to be sought for in the metaphysical subtleties.”147 By simplifying the law, juries 
could understand the proceedings and avoid being misled by the tricks of clever lawyers. 
Juries would check the authority of the professional legal class – leading to greater 
fairness by balancing the voice of the experts with the voice of the people – embodied in 
the jury. In the Randolph case, the two different styles of lawyers on his team appealed to 
two different audiences. Marshall had the knowledge, and Henry had the common touch. 
While Patrick Henry and John Marshall were preparing to defend Richard 
Randolph in the informal arena of Cumberland court, they were also engaged in a legal 
effort that would have far reaching local and national consequences. Ware v. Hylton, 
known colloquially as “the British Debts Case,” proposed to determine, after some ten 
years since the conclusion of hostilities with Britain, whether Virginia’s merchants were 
obligated to repay their debts to British creditors incurred before the war. The federal 
treaty that ended the Revolution insisted that they did, but a wartime Virginia law that 
predated it had absolved them of the responsibility. Marshall, already a committed 
nationalist, did not wish to undermine the Constitution, and in his arguments on behalf of 
the Virginia debtors he avoided the state versus federal sovereignty question.148 He 
attempted to reconcile federal supremacy with a historical argument: that the debts had 
been acquired during the Revolutionary War, when Virginia had been a sovereign state, 
and thus its wartime laws were binding on the new federal government because they 
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predated it.149 When the war ended, Marshall argued, so did Virginia’s sovereignty. 
Marshall made the case for a Virginia law to supersede a federal law – but only in this 
special instance – without providing ammunition to the current generation of state 
sovereignty advocates. The Virginian judges of the circuit court accepted Marshall and 
Henry’s argument and ruled in the their favor in 1793.  
When Marshall offered the same argument to the United States Supreme Court on 
appeal (his only appearance before that body), they unanimously dismissed him. But 
because the Supreme Court’s ruling settled the unresolved issue of prewar debts, it 
cleared the way for the future validation of prewar land titles – a subject of personal 
importance to Marshall. He had gambled most of his financial resources on purchasing 
Virginia’s Fairfax lands on the basis of a prewar British title of ownership. In the 1790s, 
the state of Virginia began to confiscate and reallocate the land on the basis that British 
titles were invalid. In this case, if state sovereignty prevailed, it would bankrupt Marshall. 
Those legal efforts overwhelmingly occupied his attention in the 1790s and kept him 
from following so many of his peers into national politics. As he had done in defense of 
Richard Randolph, Marshall skillfully ignored the assumption that the purpose of law 
was to locate truth or serve some greater sense of justice. As questions of state versus 
federal sovereignty played out in Virginia and across the nation in a 1790s, his more 
flexible interpretation drove a wedge between Marshall and many of his fellow 
Virginians.  
 In his consistent efforts to resolve the Fairfax land dispute throughout the decade, 
Marshall once again showed that he was a different breed of Virginian – not a planter-
                                                




statesman, but a speculator-statesman. The planters’ livelihood was beyond their control, 
subject to the vicissitudes of weather and international economic forces. By contrast, 
Marshall’s own talent in the courtroom would help ensure his solvency. Marshall’s brand 
of republicanism offered a new promise of financial independence through law (and land 
investment) – something a republican lawyer could hope to control, or at least influence. 
A successful, virtuous republic required land to prevent the decay that plagued European 
societies,150 and Marshall clearly understood that in the new republic, lawyers would 
determine the status of the land. Unfortunately, land speculation was hardly considered a 
“virtuous” occupation in the young republic. Though, as Isenberg points out, “land 
matters,” i.e. speculation, was “the principle pastime of all ambitious men in the early 
years of the republic.”151 
The farmers and cultivators who worked the land were, in Jefferson’s opinion, 
independent enough to populate a rational and enlightened republic. Those who bought 
the land purely for speculation and profit, on the other hand, were treated with the same 
suspicion and derision as had traditionally been reserved for professional lawyers – 
predators who acted only in their own interests and not for the greater good.  Here 
Marshall began to take a divergent path, parting ways with the other Virginians who 
gravitated to the Republican Party. He spent the better part of the decade securing his 
fortune not through labor and trade, but through combat in the courts.  British debts, 
constitutional sovereignty, and even defending errant aristocracy in the form of Richard 
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Randolph, reflected his consistent need to privilege his financial interests over republican 
ideals.  
In March of 1793, Americans learned of the escalation of the French Revolution 
and King Louis XVI’s beheading at the hands of the revolutionary mob in Paris. In April, 
as Marshall and Henry prepared Richard Randolph’s defense, the news arrived that 
France and England were at war. Seven days before the Cumberland court session, 
President Washington publicly declared his commitment to neutrality in the contest 
between the European powers.  
A month after the sensational Cumberland court inquest, the new ambassador of 
the Revolutionary French government arrived in America. Citizen Genêt aroused strong 
divisions among Americans, some who encouraged American involvement on behalf of 
the Revolutionary French and others who remained committed to President Washington’s 
neutrality pledge. Genêt’s efforts to outfit privateers in American ports and to circumvent 
the President’s authority by appealing directly to the American people created an intense 
political division. In August, John Marshall organized a public meeting in Richmond to 
protest Citizen Genêt, and convinced George Wythe to preside, much to Jefferson’s 
chagrin.152 Two years after the Genet affair, however, Wythe chaired another political 
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meeting in Richmond, this time in defiance of the Jay Treaty, a pet issue of the new 
Federalist Party.  
 Historian Richard Beeman concludes that “up until the time of the Federalist 
[anti- Genêt] meeting in Richmond, it had never been necessary for the Republicans to 
organize themselves within the state; they could always be assured of a majority in the 
legislature without the necessity of building a party structure. The decision of the 
Federalists to appeal directly to the people through county meetings changed this.”153 As 
he had done in Richard Randolph’s defense, Marshall proved remarkably adept at being 
both Federalist and popular.  
 While Marshall was organizing his home state against Citizen Genêt, his former 
law partner, Edmund Randolph, was supervising a high profile prosecution of one of the 
American privateers who had violated the neutrality pledge with Genêt’s support. Gideon 
Henfield, an American citizen, had participated in outfitting a vessel to prey upon British 
shipping before learning of the President’s declaration of neutrality.  When he arrived in 
Philadelphia, at the command of a captured British ship, Henfield was promptly arrested.  
At first, Henfield insisted that he was innocent on the basis of having put to sea as 
a privateer before the government stated its stance on neutrality. As far as he had been 
aware, he was a law-abiding American citizen. But he quickly changed his defensive 
strategy, claiming the natural right of expatriation – Henfield insisted that he had 
renounced his American citizenship and was, in fact, a French patriot and therefore not 
subject to prosecution for violating the American law. In pure republican terms, Henfield 
claimed a natural law that superseded a statutory one. Douglas Bradburn notes that 
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Henfield only formulated this argument after it emerged as his most viable legal defense; 
he had made no declaration of French citizenship before his arrest, or even in the period 
immediately after.154 Thomas Jefferson, though he agreed that Henfield possessed the 
right to renounce his citizenship, privately admitted that he doubted the defendant had 
ever intended to do so.155 Nevertheless, Jefferson embraced the legal fiction that formed 
the foundation of Henfield’s defense. This left him vulnerable to criticism from 
commentators who accused him of exhibiting the same “apostasy and sophistry” in 
defense of Henfield and Genêt that he himself leveled against those with aristocratic 
pretentions.156 Just as Marshall had constructed an airtight defense of Richard Randolph 
by compromising certain republican legal principles, Jefferson supported a convenient 
and creative construction of statute that was independent of enlightened truth, but suited 
to his immediate needs.  
 In the case of Citizen Genêt, arousing popular passion through gossip threatened 
to undermine American neutrality and draw the young republic into war. Could the legal 
system adjudicate dangerous agitators more rationally than the court of public opinion? 
A jury directly defied the explicit instructions of the judge and acquitted Henfield, 
proving that popular support of Genêt and his associates was too pervasive to be swayed 
by republican legal rationality.   
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 Jefferson had relied on the same kind of legal construction that Marshall used to 
successfully convince the magistrates, but not the public, of Richard Randolph’s 
innocence (or at least lack of culpability). In both cases, the public could not be swayed. 
In both, legal professionals had made a successful argument, and in one case there was no 
jury to question them. In the other, a judge instructed the jury that they must convict. The 
jury, however, acted independently, refusing to adhere to the appeal to legal reason.  
  In the end, St. George Tucker was unable to prevent the Randolph name from 
being tainted, though Richard’s untimely death shortly after the scandal quieted the 
rumors. In defending his stepson, Tucker fought several battles. One was for Richard’s 
and his own reputation. Another was to convert the county court system into a dual 
forum: one that allowed Tucker to defend his family’s honor and yet do so by relying on 
deliberation rather than violence.  
 Richard Randolph died in 1796 at the age of twenty-six, just three years after his 
public exoneration before the Cumberland court. He was not guilty of murder, but 
remained a social pariah. Richard still represented the vices that threatened to upset the 
gentry’s deferential authority. His trial proved that the social effects of the Revolution 
were real and pervasive. Gossip could indeed have a leveling effect, and republican law 
had not adapted to effectively resist it.  
 Richard’s behavior had threatened to disrupt the gentry’s fragile social status quo, 
and perhaps with his premature death, they breathed a sigh of relief. If so, their relief was 




hundred slaves.157 In an ironic twist, he publicly condemned the perverted morals of the 
hypocritical, self-satisfied slaveholding gentry. If his youthful indiscretions had 
undermined their authority, he posed an even greater threat from beyond the grave.  
 Not until some twenty-three years after the fact did the probable truth of the 
Randolph scandal finally come to light when Nancy - who supposedly bore the murdered 
child that night – circulated a letter of explanation among prominent Virginians. By 1815, 
Nancy had long abandoned the toxic social environment of Virginia for a new life and a 
new marriage in New York City to a respected gentleman twenty-two years her senior. 
She married Gouvernor Morris, the revered, one-legged founding father who is credited 
with authoring the preamble to the U.S. Constitution.158 Back in Virginia, the last 
survivor among St. George Tucker’s three Randolph stepsons, John Randolph of 
Roanoke, had reignited the gossip and Nancy, in turn, responded from New York with 
her version of the truth. Recalling the tumultuous winter of 1792, when she was “not yet 
seventeen,” Nancy admitted that she had been pregnant, and had indeed secretly given 
birth at their neighbor’s home.159 The father, she clarified, was not the oldest Randolph 
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brother Richard. Rather, it was the middle son, Theodorick, twenty-one years old, 
tubercular, and an alcoholic, who died almost precisely nine months before Nancy gave 
birth and to whom she was secretly engaged. Richard apparently “knew every 
circumstance” of his younger sibling’s secret. 160  He remained silent in the aftermath and 
accepted the social and legal consequences, and he took Nancy’s secret with him to the 
grave just three years later. Richard had sacrificed his own reputation to protect the honor 
of his deceased younger brother and his wife’s sister.  
 Richard’s decision to free his slaves and publicly denounce the institution that 
provided the basis for the gentry’s economic security undermined their sense of order and 
harmony. Around the same time Richard’s will became public, St. George Tucker offered 
the Virginia legislature a plan for gradual abolition. Tucker’s 1796 Dissertation on 
Slavery: with a Proposal for the Gradual Abolition of it, in the State of Virginia was 
meant as both a proposal for the consideration of the legislators and as an appeal to the 
public consciousness. Tucker recognized the ideological dilemma in the legal fiction that 
                                                                                                                                            
matter, as the evidence offers no definitive answer. Like John Marshall’s cautiously 
legalistic reassurance to Governor Morris that Nancy was not criminally culpable, Nancy 
herself resorted to insisting that “[T]here was the strictest examination…” and “The 
severest scrutiny took place,” after which Richard Randolph “was acquitted.” Ann 
‘Nancy’ Randolph Morris to John Randolph, Jan. 16, 1815, cited in William Cabell 
Bruce, John Randolph of Roanoke, 1773-1833: a biography based largely on new 
material, 2 vols. (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1922 II), 284. 
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a slave was both a person and property.161 Or maybe his stepson’s death had encouraged 
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Chapter 3: “Butting a Wall in Sport” 
 
On January 27, 1801, the United States Senate unanimously confirmed John 
Marshall as the new chief justice of the United States. It was just eight months since 
Marshall labored to decide whether he would return to a Virginian legal practice or 
accept the second offer of a position in President Adams’ cabinet. In that time, a 
contentious presidential election swept Adams and the ruling Federalist Party from office. 
In less than three months, Thomas Jefferson would begin his tenure as president, and his 
Republican Party would command a majority in Congress.  
 The outgoing Federalists scrambled to protect their waning political influence by 
enshrining their authority in the only place beyond the control of Jefferson’s popular 
mandate – the courts. New federal judgeships were created, the Supreme Court justices 
were relieved of the time consuming duty of riding to distant circuit courts, and a new 
chief justice was appointed. For the soon to be displaced Federalists, Marshall was less 
the vocal political ideologue than they desired, but he was their last viable option.  
 Though not as outspoken as his High Federalist contemporaries in New England, 
Marshall nonetheless possessed a clear political vision for the young republic. And while 
the nationalist Marshall had been growing ideologically apart from his home state of 
Virginia for some time, he continued to reside there for the next thirty-five years as he 
presided over the nation’s highest court. St. George Tucker served in the district court 
just blocks from Marshall’s home.  Former partner Edmund Randolph still plied his trade 
in the neighborhood as well. And George Wythe, still active in his mid-seventies, sat on 




former colleagues in Richmond’s courts, Marshall continued to have influence in 
Virginia, especially in those rare cases when the Supreme Court was forced to confront 
the institution of slavery – one of the most difficult political and legal issues facing the 
new republic. 
The era of the Marshall Court is often viewed as a time of remarkable unity, when 
few justices dissented and the court spoke with one voice (usually Marshall’s).  The 
significant slavery cases argued before the court, however, illustrate the impossibility of 
compromise. A fundamental contradiction between natural rights and property rights 
could not be easily reconciled, especially when a Virginian was guiding the proceedings. 
Marshall’s legal reasoning, both as chief justice and as a Virginian lawyer, illustrates how 
debates over the sources of legal authority, the moral limits (and obligations) of law, and 
the distribution of legal power played out in cases involving slavery.  
One of Marshall’s most significant slavery decisions as chief justice came in 1825 
with the Antelope case.162 The court had to determine the legal status of more than two 
hundred African slaves, illegally taken by American pirates when they captured a 
Spanish vessel, the Antelope. The slave trade had long been outlawed in the United 
States, but not in Spain and Portugal. The complement of slaves aboard the Antelope was 
a mixture of Spanish property, acquired legally by the ship’s crew according to Spanish 
law, and some were captured from a Portuguese vessel. Complicating matters, twenty-
five of the slaves had been forcibly taken from an American vessel illegally engaged in 
the slave trade. The Spanish and Portuguese governments demanded that all of the slaves 
be returned, as they were legally acquired under the laws of the respective countries. The 
                                                




U.S. attorney general, William Wirt, argued that the trade was not only illegal under 
American law, but international law as well. The combined actions of the United States, 
Britain, and France to ban the trade, as well as limitations imposed on it by collective 
diplomatic actions in Europe, meant that slavery was, by implication, banned by 
international law. Thus if Spanish and Portuguese slaves, their own laws notwithstanding, 
came into the possession of the United States, the court was in no way bound to return 
them. Justice Joseph Story, by now an intimate friend of Marshall as well as an associate 
justice, had made the same argument in an earlier circuit court ruling of U.S. v. La Jeune 
Eugenie in 1822.163  
The friendship between Story and Marshall was based on a remarkable 
compatibility of their temperaments. But in politics and legal philosophy, they parted 
ways significantly. In his earlier ruling in the Massachusetts circuit court, Story 
proclaimed in no uncertain terms that “Christian duty” as well as the “external maxims of 
social justice” made the slave trade illegal on simple grounds of morality.164 It was 
clearly morally wrong, and therefore not legal. Story backed up his moral argument with 
a positive legal construction, noting that the preponderance of international action against 
the trade made its illegality enforceable in American courts.  
Marshall soundly rejected Story’s, as well as Wirt’s, reasoning in the Antelope 
case. Addressing the broad issue of whether slavery was sanctioned by international law, 
Marshall denied the authority of his court to make a legal decision binding on other 
nations. He conceded that nations, gathered for that specific purpose, might indeed pass 
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international legislation or treaties banning the trade if they so desired, but insisted that 
the collective actions of the few could not be binding on all. As such, Spain and Portugal, 
in Marshall’s opinion, could not be prohibited from trading in human property, and the 
Antelope’s Spanish and Portuguese slaves would be returned.  
Addressing the specific question of which slaves should be freed, the Marshall 
Court faced another crucial determination. In the Antelope case, as in many of the early 
republic’s complicated slavery suits, the practical limits of the dilemma often hinged 
upon a judge’s decision of who bore the burden of proof. Rather than assuming that all of 
the slaves were property of the foreign governments and ordering them promptly 
returned, the court placed the burden of proof on Spain and Portugal to provide 
documentation of their claims. Because the Portuguese had no proof of ownership (their 
slaves in this case had been pirated onto a Spanish vessel), their slaves were freed. Spain 
could prove ownership of twenty percent of the remaining slaves, and so that number was 
chosen by lot to be returned to bondage.165  
In his decision on the Antelope case, Marshall offered an equivocal denunciation 
of slavery that echoed the sentiment of fellow Virginian Thomas Jefferson. Both men 
expressed dissatisfaction with the institution, but neither could imagine that their 
respective positions of power offered them any means to correct it. For Marshall, the 
limitation was based in his perception of the source of legal authority in three areas: legal 
precedent was rooted in tradition; the law’s moral limits aimed at maintaining order while 
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not upsetting the stability of society; and the federal system placed limits on the judicial 
branch, which was independent, but could not impose its will arbitrarily. 
“That [the slave trade] is contrary to the law of nature will scarcely be denied,” 
read the court’s decision, “That every man has a natural right to the fruits of his own 
labor is generally admitted.”166 As to whether the law of nature superseded the law of 
nations, the court’s (and Marshall’s) opinion was clear. “Slavery… has its origin in force; 
but as the world has agreed that it is a legitimate result of force, the state of things which 
is thus produced by general consent cannot be pronounced unlawful.”167 By contrast, 
Justice Story had declared in the La Jeune Euginie case, “It is insufficient to stamp any 
trade as interdicted by public law, when it can justly be affirmed, that it is repugnant to 
the general principles of justice and humanity.”168 
Legal challenges to slavery in the early republic forced lawyers and judges to 
define their own balance between law and morality when the two clashed. Marshall 
conceded that force could determine legitimacy, at least as far as slavery was concerned. 
Even if slavery was immoral, it could be lawful if upheld by custom and consent. The 
admiring biographer Albert Beveridge recognized that Marshall’s stance on slavery 
rejected “humanitarian” impulses, but instead put political interests first.169 Later in life, 
Marshall was actively involved in the American Colonization Society, which sought to 
gradually emancipate Virginia’s slaves and relocate them to Liberia. But the cornerstone 
                                                
166 23 U.S. (10 Wheat.) 66 
167 Ibid. 
168 United States v. La Jeune Eugenie, 26 Federal Cases 832 (1822) 846-48 
quoted in William Wiecek, “Slavery and Abolition Before the United States Supreme 
Court, 1820-1860,” The Journal of American History 65 (June 1978): 37. 
169 Beveridge wrote: “There was nothing in him of the humanitarian reformer. But there 




of the colonization effort – the removal of free blacks from a white republic – at least 
suggests that Marshall shared the common Virginian view that racial cohabitation was 
impossible, or at least undesirable.  
In a lifetime of arguments and decisions, Marshall’s balance between the rights of 
man and the rights of property is fairly consistent.170 As a lawyer and a judge, he argued 
for the protection of property rights over natural law, though he drew a clear legal 
distinction between inanimate property and property in human beings.  
As a Virginia lawyer in 1798, Marshall argued for this distinction on behalf of 
Robert Pleasants. A Richmond Quaker, Pleasants sued his relatives who refused to 
manumit certain slaves as dictated by his father’s will.  Instead of arguing abstractly in 
favor of natural rights, Marshall posited a legal argument hinged on there being an 
inherent difference between applying the law to objects and people, even if both were 
property. The law must, he argued, take this difference into consideration. In the lower 
Chancery Court, George Wythe agreed. On appeal, District Judge St. George Tucker 
dismissed Marshall’s construction.  
More than thirty years later, Chief Justice Marshall applied the same logic to the 
case of Boyce v. Anderson (1829). The claimants sought damages from the operators of 
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the steamboat Washington for the loss of four slaves, who drowned in the Mississippi 
River. The slaves had escaped a crippled vessel, the Teche, for the safety of the shore. 
The plaintiffs alleged negligence on the part of the Washington’s crew, who were 
responsible for conveying the slaves from the shore of the river to their steamboat. Had 
the operators of the Washington been salvaging baggage or freight from the shore, the 
burden of proof was relatively low and they would be liable for the lost property. The 
legal question at issue was whether the Washington had taken on freight or passengers 
when it undertook to retrieve the slaves. The court applied the stricter standard of 
evidence, acknowledging that the slaves, though property, were legally discernable from 
“inanimate matter.” In the court’s decision, Marshall specified, “A slave has volition, and 
has feelings which cannot be entirely disregarded... In the nature of things and in his 
character, he resembles a passenger, not a package of goods.”171 
In the Antelope case, Marshall expressed a similar sentiment regarding the burden 
of proof where slaves as property were concerned. “A distinction is taken between men, 
who are generally free, and goods, which are always property,” the court determined. 
When assessing the evidence, “…something more is necessary where men are 
claimed.”172 Marshall’s consistent reasoning in the federal court reflects a long tradition 
in Virginia, examined by Malick Ghachem, of relying on a legal fabrication of “mixed 
character” to allow the contradictory status of slaves as concurrently persons and property 
to be legally coherent.173 
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In addition to navigating the murky legal status of slaves as both human and 
property, lawyers and judges of the early republic had to contend with the equally vexing 
issue of how to distinguish race. Enslaved status was not determined solely by race – 
slaves were a legal caste distinct from free persons of color, whose existence challenged 
the stability of the social order by preventing white Virginians from relying on racial 
criteria to delineate who deserved the benefits of citizenship and who did not.174 And 
because slavery passed from mother to child but not from father to child, visual 
characteristics eventually became all but useless in decoding race as the law had defined 
it. Quirks of genealogy and variations in appearance brought some of the most significant 
challenges to the slavery in the courts.175 
In Mima Queen v. Hepburn (1813), the Supreme Court threw out a freedom suit 
because there was no living witness who could substantiate Mima Queen’s claim that she 
was distantly descended from a free woman and therefore free. Her lawyers offered 
hearsay evidence from whites in her community, who recalled that it was generally 
acknowledged that Mima Queen was a matrilineal descendant of Mary Queen, a free 
woman. In other issues of law, hearsay evidence was inadmissible. But an applicable 
common law rule in Maryland allowed such indirect testimony to be considered in 
establishing lineage in freedom suits, simply because in the vast majority of such cases, 
no other evidence could possibly exist. When rumor was the only corroboration available, 
the Maryland law allowed that race could be subject to community standards – and that if 
something was well understood by the general population to be true, it was accepted as 
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true in the court. This style of adjudication, in the manner of rural, county court justice, 
was the only possibility for Mima Quenn to secure her freedom.  
When Marshall defended Richard Randolph at the Cumberland County Court in 
1793, his defense strategy depended significantly on the inability of slaves to testify and 
the inadmissibility of whites’ hearsay evidence to corroborate what the slaves had seen. 
Though the community had judged the evidence to be compelling – that there was a body 
and therefore a crime – he urged that strict rules of evidence should be adhered to 
because the community was biased against the defendant. Gossip had muddied the 
waters, and to counteract this bias, Marshall had called for a higher standard of evidence.  
Twenty years later, Marshall’s sentiment had not changed. He would not make an 
exception for the benefit of the enslaved. They were more than freight, yes, but they were 
entitled to no special consideration. Evidence in slave freedom suits was subject to the 
same strict standard of evidence– even thought it would be inestimably harder to meet 
that burden of proof. The court ruled against Mima Queen, relegating she and her 
daughter to bondage.  
Relatively new Supreme Court appointee Gabriel Duval, of Maryland, understood 
the traditions and habits of slave freedom suits in his home state, and adamantly dissented 
from the court’s majority opinion. First, he wrote, “to exclude hearsay in such cases 
would leave the party interested without remedy.”176 And, even more importantly, Duvall 
boldly proclaimed, “It will be universally admitted that the right to freedom, is more 
important than the right to property.”177 At a time when the Supreme Court made a 
strenuous effort at projecting an image of unity, slavery cases and the fundamental 
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contradictions they exposed challenged their conciliatory façade like no other issue. 
Duvall’s argument against depriving slaves of one of their only means of legal recourse, 
for example, was his only dissent in twenty-five years on the court.  
James Kettner notes that these first decades of the nineteenth century produced a 
fundamental “conflict of laws” between the application of slavery principles in the North 
and in the South. In practice, the legal fiction of slaves’ status diverged in local 
application and the Supreme Court was reluctant to side with either region.178 George 
William Van Cleve further notes that St. George Tucker’s failed attempt at measured 
emancipation in Virginia illustrated that the institution would continue to grow absent 
intervention at the federal level.179 
Marshall’s biographers tend to be forgiving when evaluating the Chief Justice’s 
failure to address the slavery issue. Smith, for example, says that though Marshall 
unerringly supported the right of property in the slave cases brought before him, that “his 
dicta became increasingly hostile” over time.180 Yet Smith’s only evidence was 
Marshall’s involvement in the doomed colonization effort, whose ideological basis was 
far from progressive.181 Donald Roper forgives Marshall’s ambivalence by insisting that 
definitive action opposing slavery could have had “little effect on the impending 
crisis.”182 William Wiecek recognizes Marshall’s anti-slavery activity as circumspect, but 
credits Marshall for displaying a keen sense of the Supreme Court's limitations. He notes 
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that the Marshall court simply dodged the slavery issue, knowing that it could not resolve 
it. The later court lacked Marshall’s caution and attempted to address the issue, ultimately 
precipitating Civil War.  
Marshall, for his part, readily acknowledged his desire to avoid ruling on the 
constitutionality of slavery altogether. In 1823, the Brig Wilson case allowed him the 
opportunity to address a Virginia law, similar to one in South Carolina, which combined 
the issues of state sovereignty and the prohibition of the slave trade. This case provided 
Marshall a platform to extend, if he desired, the reach of federal supremacy with regard 
to slavery. “A case has been brought before me in which I might have considered its 
constitutionality, had I chosen to do so,” Marshall remarked to his friend Joseph Story. 
But, Marshall mused, “as I am not fond of butting a wall in sport, I escaped on the 
construction of the act.”183 
Historians are reluctant to critically evaluate Marshall’s views on slavery. 
Because he deliberately avoided recording his opinions on the subject in detail, the 
scholar is left with limited resources from which to draw conclusions. Unlike Jefferson, 
Marshall did not ruminate on race and emancipation for the benefit of correspondents and 
posterity. Unlike Tucker, he did not publicly announce the dangers of failing to ignore the 
legal dilemma and offer a legislative solution. And unlike Wythe, his private affairs did 
not make his views on race abundantly clear. Additionally, because Wythe served alone 
of the bench, his opinions can be read as clear indications of his individual legal 
reasoning. The Supreme Court’s opinions, on the other hand, must be read as the product 
of communal consensus. As a subject of undeniable significance, Marshall attracts no 
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shortage of admiring biographers. The tendency to look for the best in Marshall’s 
character contributes to the reluctance of historians to go very far in filling in the blank 
spaces in the historical record.  But the same characteristics admiring biographers 
espouse – such as Marshall’s ability to deftly construct the law to suit his political vision 
for the republic – make all the more glaring his deliberate refusal to bring that legal talent 
to bear on one of the most pressing issues of the day. Though he chose not to record his 
personal opinions on slavery for posterity, that he actively ignored it speaks volumes.  
 Back in Richmond, a world away from the political considerations of the Marshall 
court, George Wythe remained a permanent fixture in his comfortable position on the 
bench of the Chancery Court, which he occupied from 1789 until his death seventeen 
years later, where was the only judge of that tribunal.184 In essence, equity law in Virginia 
was exclusively George Wythe’s law. Long before Marshall’s tenure on the Supreme 
Court cultivated his nationalist conception of judicial supremacy, Wythe personified 
judicial independence in Virginia. In 1782, Wythe offered the first recorded instance of a 
judge asserting the authority to determine the constitutionality of the law, in 
Commonwealth v. Canton.185 In stronger language than Marshall ever used, Wythe 
warned the state legislature that if they “should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed 
by them by the people, I, in administering the public justice of the country, will meet 
their united powers at my seat in the tribunal; and pointing to the Constitution, will say to 
them, 'here is the limit of your authority; and hither shall you go but no further."186 
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 Despite its incendiary language, Wythe’s statement caused little uproar because it 
did not actually attempt to overturn a legislative act. It affirmed one, and then warned that 
next time the legislators might not be so fortunate. Since it ruled in the negative, it 
amounted to no more than a non-binding legal opinion. Marshall built upon, but 
expanded, this Virginian tradition of law with his landmark decision in Marbury v. 
Madison in 1803, when he similarly asserted judicial supremacy while ruling in the 
negative. While limited in its immediate effect, the rhetorical significance of Wythe’s 
declaration, coming from the commonwealth’s most independent judge, foreshadowed 
the attitude Wythe would display toward the most challenging questions of law posed by 
slavery. 
 When called upon to judge complicated legal principles in his court, Wythe relied 
upon the Virginia constitution as his source of authority. Drafted during the height of 
Revolutionary fervor in 1776, the document remained unchanged during Wythe’s tenure 
as chancellor, allowing him to cast himself as the defender of natural law and natural 
rights. He positioned himself as a classical republican in an increasingly liberal legal 
culture.187 Jefferson and Marshall, despite their intense personal and ideological 
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divisions, shared an inability, as national political figures, to affect any substantive 
challenge to slavery’s existence in the republic. Citing its longstanding sanction by the 
community as the basis for its legality, Marshall said of the slave trade in the Antelope 
case, “This court must not yield to feelings which might seduce it from the path of duty, 
and must obey the mandate of the law.”188 For Marshall, the impersonal application of 
legal principles meant that for the moment, custom trumped concerns of humanity. In 
Wythe’s estimation, however, those very “feelings” (of human compassion, natural 
rights, and justice) that Marshall dismissed as legal distraction were, for him, the very 
basis for the law’s authority.  
 The volume of equity cases in Virginia eventually necessitated the creation of 
additional chancery courts in eastern and western Virginia in 1802. Wythe remained the 
sole chancellor in the central district of Richmond even as he approached his eightieth 
birthday. The equity principles that governed Wythe’s court, as well as his virtual 
independence on the bench, meant that he was uniquely free to apply his own personal 
views on republican law in a manner not available to most judges. When the unusual 
republican dilemma of slavery appeared in Wythe’s court, the subject, more than any 
other, reflected his personal philosophy.  
 The idea of judicial review was not new when Wythe expressed it in 1782, any 
more so than when John Marshall specified it twenty-one years later in Marbury v. 
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Madison. In America, as early as 1776, John Adams suggested that independent judges 
would be required to check the potential abuses of power by the legislative or executive 
branches in a three-branch system of government that had yet to come into existence.189 
In The Spirit of the Laws, Montesquieu had described such a government, but conceded 
that the judicial branch would be “in some fashion, null.”190 Alexander Hamilton agreed 
eleven years later when he wrote, in Federalist 78, that the federal judiciary would 
possess “neither force nor will.”191 St. George Tucker likewise bemoaned the 
subservience of the judicial branch by quoting Montesquieu in his edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries.192 
 In practice, judges in the early years of the republic wielded little more power 
than Montesquieu or Hamilton had imagined. Judicial review was often discussed but 
rarely asserted. But the foundation laid by Adams, in his pamphlet Thoughts on 
Government in 1776, whose logic was adopted by George Mason and integrated into 
Virginia’s constitution of the same year, provided the means for assertive judges to 
slowly fashion the judiciary into an appropriately authoritative check on the executive 
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and the legislature.193 In Virginia, from the 1780s on, Wythe spearheaded this effort. 
Elevated to the nation’s highest tribunal in 1801, John Marshall built on the tradition.  
  Despite his confidence of his own judicial independence, Wythe’s rulings in the 
court of equity were subject to review in a court of law at Richmond’s General Court of 
Appeals. Above Wythe in the legal chain of command presided Edmund Pendleton – the 
same amiable lawyer whose force of personality had often bested Wythe’s intellect in 
Virginia’s colonial courts. A biographer notes that during this period of judicial 
independence, more than half of the decisions appealed from Wythe’s Chancery Court 
were modified or reversed by Pendleton’s Court of Appeals.194 Thus the mid-century 
disagreements over the nature of law still provided a source of tension and conflict, even 
in the post-revolutionary commonwealth. Wythe and Pendleton, the last living links to 
the colonial legal culture, still struggled to apply their own visions of the law to benefit 
society, a dichotomy only broken by Pendleton’s death, at age eighty-two, in 1803. The 
vacant position on the Court of Appeals, in turn, was offered to St. George Tucker.  
 St. George Tucker left the District Court bench for the Virginia Court of Appeals 
in 1803, and the increased responsibility of the higher court prompted him to quit the law 
professorship at the College of William and Mary. He followed Wythe’s footsteps from 
educating Virginia’s young republicans to actively applying that law in the 
commonwealth’s highest courts. As a judge of the Appeals Court, Tucker often had the 
task of reviewing, correcting, and sometimes criticizing Wythe’s version of the law.  
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 George Wythe and St. George Tucker, as relatively minor figures in the grand 
history of the early republic, are often described simply as Jeffersonian or Republican in 
their legal and political thinking. Those who have explored their interaction further have 
found the more nuanced realities that underlie the popular categories of analysis. Eva 
Shepard Wolf correctly characterizes Wythe as “one of the most liberal judges in 
Virginia,”195 while Christopher Doyle, in more than one publication, offers persuasive 
evidence of the overwhelmingly conservative nature of Tucker’s republicanism.196 
Jefferson respected, influenced, and sought counsel from both men.197  
 Tucker publicly displayed his suspicion of the national Federalist Party. In a letter 
to John Marshall, written on the occasion of the death of George Washington in 1799, 
Tucker reminded his old Federalist friend of his “forever unbounded veneration” for the 
first president. He could not resist slipping in that “by some circumstances in his 
administration,” his respect for Washington had been reduced, but “within limits,” of 
course.198 Tucker enclosed a brief memorial eulogy, in Latin, which he suggested might 
make a suitable inscription for a national monument to Washington. He recorded the 
exchange in his personal notebook and on the following pages he set about drafting a 
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proposed revision for the United States Constitution. With Washington gone, he 
suggested the repeal of Article II – the provision for the Executive Branch – in its 
entirety. In place of a president, Tucker offered the alternative of a “Federal Council of 
the United States,” consisting of one deputy from each state in the Union.199  
 Tucker’s sentiment recalls the efforts of George Mason and Edmund Randolph, 
who, at the Constitutional Convention, had suggested an advisory council similar to 
Tucker’s new proposal. 200 Tucker, Mason, and Jefferson alike feared what Tucker called 
an "elective aristocracy.” Locally, the deference to a seemingly hereditary progression of 
county magistrates and administrators in the courts similarly bothered Tucker, and he 
never ceased criticizing the backward and unrepublican nature of county justice. Though, 
in the case of his stepson Richard, its faults had served his interests well.201 
 In one sense, Tucker’s views on the executive reflect a Jeffersonian tendency to 
encourage democratic participation as a preventative measure against the potential 
tyranny of a powerful executive. The death of Washington provided a possible 
opportunity to revise the national government into something more like the previous 
Confederation; a regional solution to the Virginians’ fears of Northern influence. 
Tucker’s revision of Blackstone’s Commentaries a few years later offered one of the first 
detailed, public legal justifications of what became known as the “compact theory” – the 
contention that each state possessed the legal authority to judge the constitutionality of 
federal legislation. 
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 Marshall, on the other hand, believed in the concept of the “great man,” who was 
uniquely suited to lead. Washington was such as man, Marshall’s father had been such a 
man, and Marshall believed he was as well. The unique opportunity of the Revolution 
had elevated superior men, and it was those men’s responsibility, it followed, to utilize 
the their leadership positions to adopt measures to protect the people from their own ill-
advised decisions before the corrosive effects of democracy took that power away. 
Marshall stressed a strong executive – an idea that went against the traditional Virginian 
notion of republicanism. Virginia, under the wartime direction of Wythe, Mason, and 
Jefferson, had established a very weak executive. No one man, no matter how great, 
could rule Virginia from either the governor’s office or the bench.  
 Tucker ultimately conceded somewhat to Marshall’s viewpoint insomuch as he 
acknowledged that popular democratic passion represented a more clear and present 
danger than did an overreaching executive. He did not present his proposed amendment 
to Congress, and in its margin he scribbled, “The Experiment of an Executive Directory 
in France, by no means tends to recommend this amendment. ‘We are better as we 
are.’”202 
 Even for a distinctly local figure like Tucker, national politics and international 
events shaped the evolution of his concept of republican law. The chaos of the French 
Revolution stoked American fears of the fragility of their own republic, and warned that 
rampant democracy might violently displace it. The simultaneous slave revolt in Haiti 
offered nervous Virginians a glimpse of what might happen if the legal community 
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continued to ignore the contradiction between the property rights of white men and the 
natural rights of slaves.203  
 At this time Virginia’s most distinguished legal minds consistently concluded that 
the judiciary offered the best hope to ensure the survival of the republic in the new 
century. Wythe, the eldest and the freest from institutional or political oversight, used the 
bench to keep the ideals of 1776 alive in the courts, to the consternation of the more 
conservative judges who heard his cases on appeal. Tucker, an upwardly mobile young 
man of the Revolution, united the nervous gentry’s need for order and deference with the 
Republicans’ distrust of monarchical rule. His alliance with Jefferson, his revision of 
Blackstone, and his legal efforts to address slavery reflect the difficulty of reconciling 
those ideals. Marshall, the frontier-gentry turned Federal judge, cautiously navigated the 
ideological gray area between interested politics and scientific law – an immemorial 
intersection that was seamless in Virginia but problematic in Washington. Even 
Jefferson, long absent from direct involvement in functional law in Virginia, remained an 
ever-present guiding force in republican legal thought in the new cultural era of the 
Jeffersonian Revolution. 
 “Slaves and Indians,” Robert Faulkner writes, “were those unfortunate men 
essentially outside of America’s civil society, but ruled by it.”204 Though the law acted 
upon them, their legal opportunities were few. After 1795, however, slaves could sue as 
paupers.205 The circumstances of the court system meant that for most slaves, their first 
appearance in Virginia’s legal culture would be before the Chancery Court and George 
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Wythe. His equity court addressed cases where the common law offered no procedure for 
redress or where its application clearly contradicted basic principles of fairness. The 
function of the court of equity differed from the court of law in other significant ways as 
well. In simplest terms, a claimant applied to the General Court for compensation, 
especially in the form of money. For example, a farmer could ask the court to compel a 
neighbor to pay for a damaged fence, or, in Virginia, to punish them for killing or 
maiming their slave property.  
 The Chancery Court, on the other hand, addressed a different sort of legal need – 
to compel a fair action or to prevent a harmful one, rather than to compensate after the 
fact. An injunction, for example, came from the Chancery Court, as did any attempt to 
modify the conditions of an existing contract. For example, a slave claiming free status 
benefitted little from the prospect of monetary compensation or from punishing their 
attacker. The remedies of the General Court could not alter their location or status, 
especially when threatened with sale to the deep South. The Chancery Court could halt 
their sale and ultimately order the owner to free his human property.  In this manner, 
many of the most difficult questions aroused by slavery in the republic came to George 
Wythe before anyone else.  
 Wythe’s personal views on slavery can be interpreted from his private behavior as 
much as judicial decisions. When his wife died in 1787, just before the reorganization of 
the courts prompted his retirement from William and Mary and appointment to the 
Chancery bench, Wythe freed his own slaves.206 His forty-five year old cook and 
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housekeeper, Lydia Broadnax, stayed on as his free servant, relocating with him to 
Richmond in 1791. The same year, Michael Brown, a free mulatto boy of unknown 
parentage was born. By the end of the decade, Michael resided in the Wythe household, 
receiving all the benefits of a Wythe-supervised education. 207 Broadnax divided her time 
between duties in Wythe’s household and taking in boarders at her own house in the 
city.208 Upon his death in 1806, Wythe, who had no children, provided in his will for the 
financial support of Lydia and Michael, as well as another of the slaves he freed in 1787.  
 St. George Tucker maintained his planter status and his extensive slave holdings, 
even as he decried the theoretical evils of slavery. Like other Virginians, he blamed the 
British for binding the colonists to the reprehensible system. But unlike most of them, he 
undertook some practical attempts to compose a palatable solution to extricate the 
Americans from their dilemma without disrupting the social order.  
 Tucker expressed a Jeffersonian optimism about the transformative power of the 
Revolution, which he deemed the perfect time to cast off the corrupt English tradition, 
just as Jefferson had desired to cast off the constraints of English common law. “Should 
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we not have left our gift upon the altar,” Tucker declared, “that we might first be 
reconciled to our brethren whom we held in bondage? Should we not have loosed their 
chains, and broken their fetters?” Eva Shepard Wolf, in her examination of manumission 
practices in Virginia, finds that the period immediately following the Revolution indeed 
offered cause of optimism among antislavery advocates. Their hopes dissolved over time, 
ironically because increasingly successful efforts at individual manumission emphasized 
the existence of free blacks in the community, causing the stability of racial order - as 
perceived by white Virginians - to break down.209 And George William Van Cleve cites 
Tucker’s 1796 abolition proposal as one of the last plausible efforts to keep slavery a 
local, rather than federal, problem.210   
 Tucker’s attitude toward slavery coincides with his general approach to 
republican law: that the chaos of Revolution provided the appropriate time for the mass 
restructuring of society, but that once the Revolution was complete and society returned 
to orderly operation, change must occur within the strict confines of law. Thus Tucker’s 
postwar abolition plan was thoroughly conservative, even if his language borrowed from 
the radicalism of Revolutionary sentiment. In fact, Tucker’s plan accomplished abolition 
without a single emancipation. No slave alive at the time of the passage of the bill would 
die free. Their children would be bound to servitude for the first decades of their lives in 
order to compensate their masters for their value, and then their children, in turn, would 
be free. Full emancipation would take about a hundred years, allowing slaveholders to 
slowly transition to paid labor and not costing them a penny in lost equity. Economic 
stability trumped humanitarian concerns, although it is impossible to estimate to what 
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extent this proposal represented Tucker’s own convictions or is his pragmatic realization 
of the overwhelming conservatism of the legislature. His stepson Richard and fellow 
judge George Wythe actively introduced the destabilizing elements of free blacks into the 
community, but Tucker certainly preferred gradual abolition and removal. Even so, he 
urgently warned, “considerations of policy, as well as justice and humanity, must evince 
the necessity of eradicating the evil, before it becomes impossible to do it, without tearing 
up the roots of civil society with it.”211 
 Tucker sounded definitively Jeffersonian when he wrote, in opposition of slavery, 
“democracy…” forms “ the basis and foundation of our government. For our [Virginia] 
bill of rights, declares, “that all men are, by nature equally free, and independent, and 
have certain rights of which they cannot deprive or divest their posterity… namely the 
enjoyment of life and liberty, with the means of acquiring and possessing property.”212 
Tucker’s celebration of Virginia’s Bill of Rights contained the primary republican 
contradiction of human and property rights, but his Dissertation on Slavery offered the 
solution. First, free the slaves, who, as human beings, were suited for liberty, but as 
inferiors, not for equality.213 Second, make them leave the state by their own volition. 
Tucker concluded African colonization too expensive to be practicable, so he simply 
opted to make existence for free blacks in Virginia so unbearable that they would leave of 
their own accord. With this accomplished, both the dilemmas of liberty versus property 
and the unsettling question of racial cohabitation would be solved, in Tucker’s 
estimation. Jefferson, as noted, allowed for no such possibility. Former slaves should be 
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exiled from Virginia (and the American continent) after emancipation, lest their 
proximity to white republicans “produce convulsions which will probably never end but 
in the extermination of one or the other race.”214 
 Before attempting to formulate a feasible plan to eliminate the slavery dilemma, 
Tucker solicited advice of Massachusetts clergymen Jeremy Belknap. The reverend, in 
turn, circulated Tucker’s inquiry among many prominent men of Massachusetts, 
including then vice-president John Adams. Adams, in his 1776 Thoughts on Government, 
had provided the seed for the logic that underpinned the independent judiciary in Virginia 
that George Wythe and St. George Tucker now enjoyed. Perhaps he and other prominent 
New Englanders could provide Tucker the necessary insight to affect gradual abolition in 
the southern states as had been accomplished in the North. Tucker, however, voiced a 
critical distinction. In a letter to Belknap of November 27, 1795, Tucker insisted "Blacks 
and Mulattoes should be excluded from all the valuable rights of Citizenship.” “Narrow 
as that policy may appear,” Tucker conceded, “I am persuaded it is necessary for the 
preservation of the peace of Society."215 Unlike Jefferson, who voiced an unapologetic 
assertion of the superiority of the white race in Notes on the State of Virginia, and 
Marshall, who remained effectively silent on his personal racial views, Tucker openly 
acknowledged his prejudice, while publicly apologizing for it.216 
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 Tucker’s apology for his racism and efforts at gradual emancipation (in seeking 
counsel from New England, proposing legislation, and publishing it all) speak to his 
commitment to a republican ideal of speaking to posterity. For Tucker who tried to 
legislate it away, for Wythe who tried to strike it down from the bench, and for Jefferson 
who could not address it at the national level, slavery was a local problem. More 
importantly, it was problem for the future. Wythe’s efforts were immediate but subject to 
revision by the more conservative appeals courts. Tucker’s were pragmatic and dispersed 
the solution over multiple generations. In national politics, Jefferson expressed the 
opinion that each generation should revise its laws. His position was radically different 
from Marshall’s, whose sacrosanct federal Constitution was elevated above popular 
meddling. 
The Virginia legislature, however, failed to enact Tucker’s emancipation plan, 
and as a republican judge, he felt his hands were tied. Even as a strong proponent of 
judicial review and supremacy, his conception of that power was very limited. When 
slavery appeared in his court, he continually acted as a Jeffersonian Republican, insomuch 
as he conceded to the primacy of the legislature. Of this approach to law, Tucker 
explained, “if the will of the majority is not permitted to prevail in questions where the 
whole society is interested, that of the minority necessarily must. The society, therefore, in 
such a case, would be under the influence of a minority of its members, which, generally 
speaking, can on no principle be justified.”217 In his view, judges were bound to enforce 
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the law, not construct it. They “interpreted” only where the meaning of the statute was 
indiscernible, not just disagreeable. Therefore if the legislature would not pass his anti-
slavery legislation, he refused to find a way to enact it from the bench. 
 George Wythe seemed to have no such qualms about judge-made law. In the case 
of slavery, he clearly believed the majority in Virginia to be wrong, and the common law 
was wrong as well. Time, tradition, and precedent clearly dictated slavery’s legality in 
Virginia. Enlightenment law promised the moral certainty that common law obscured, 
and Wythe’s comfortable independence on the bench allowed him to practice his vision 
unobstructed. Of Wythe’s relationship to the common law, Kirtland concluded that the 
Chancellor apparently “had no quarrel with precedent as such, but is critical only of its 
undiscriminating application.”218 This, in essence, was the function of the Chancery 
Court – to mediate the harsh aspects of the common law. In this case, common law 
allowed for consistent, predictable application, but its predictability stifled liberty. 
Kirtland contends that Wythe’s jurisprudence acknowledged that rigorous predictability 
occasionally stifled the real object of the law – substantial justice.219 Post-Revolutionary 
law was aimed at fairness, but republican judges had to choose whether slaveholders or 
slaves themselves deserved “justice” when they opposed each other in the courts.  
 In 1776, John Adams had warned that juries could not be trusted to have the 
capacity to function as en effective check on the legislative and executive branches; a 
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cadre of professional judges would have to guide them.220 Jury participation offered a 
tangible exercise of the Revolution’s promise of popular participation, but the successes 
of amateur lawyers like Patrick Henry in swaying juries from rational decisions also 
worried Jefferson. If common juries were free from the corruption of law’s “metaphysical 
subtleties,” they were also free from the refined reasoning of the Enlightenment. 
Jefferson realized that no simple solution existed. Ultimately, he decided that in 
protecting republican virtue, “honest ignorance would be safer than perverted science.”221 
 The honest ignorance Jefferson preferred, however, had certain restrictions. He 
sought to restrict foreigners from juries,222 and he desired to grant the House of Delegates 
the power to impeach federal grand jurors and jurors – a responsibility that would nudge 
legal authority nearer to the state level and away from the federal level, as well as away 
from a federal judiciary and closer to a legislature. Like Tucker, Jefferson still believed 
that only freeholders should serve on juries. In short, Virginian jurors should have vested 
interest in Virginia – the classical republican notion still prevailed that property was the 
measure of autonomy. John Marshall, despite his innumerable differences with Jefferson 
on many counts, expressed an identical conviction at the convention to revise Virginia’s 
Constitution in 1829-1830. As one of the last remaining political figures of the founding 
generation, Marshall clung to the notion that property ownership should dictate civil 
status. 
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St. George Tucker shared the Jeffersonian concern for encouraging able juries as 
a healthy part of the democratic impulse. In 1798, Jefferson suggested that juries be 
chosen by election and thus be subject to democratic accountability – another instance of 
adapting the political paradigm to the needs of republican law. Tucker’s solution differed; 
he betrayed the elitist streak that separated him from Jefferson in this regard. Jurors, 
Tucker insisted, should be “men whose understandings may be presumed to be above the 
common level.”223 Helpfully, Tucker offered a list of the sorts of gentlemen who could be 
presumed to make good jurors. His list of qualifications was short: “honest, discreet, and 
intelligent.” In addition to those intangible qualities of character, Tucker offered a more 
precise list of acceptable occupations. Only “yeoman, freeholders, merchants, and 
traders,” should populate the jury box. His extensive list of undesirables is much more 
lengthy and specific: 
clergymen, practitioners of physic, or surgery, or attorneys of any court, sheriffs, 
or their deputies, collectors of the public taxes, county-levies, or poor rates, 
overseers of the poor, county surveyors (a stipulation that would have disqualified 
George Washington and his friend Thomas Marshall from public service), or their 
deputies, inspectors of tobacco, ferry-keepers, or constables ; nor tavern keepers, 
distillers (disqualifying Washington again!), or venders of spirits by retail, 
overseers or managers of plantations or mills for others, merchants’ clerks, or 
shopkeepers (precluding, for a time, Patrick Henry), journeymen, or apprentices ; 
nor such as be, or be reputed to be conspirators, barretors, champertors, 
embracers, maintainers or movers of suits, swindlers, gamblers, idle haunters or 
frequenters of taverns, breakers or disturbers of the peace, or other disorderly 
persons, or person, whatsoever ; but altogether be of the best fame, reputation, 
and understanding, and credit, in their country.224 
 
 Precisely who would determine which potential jurors possessed the disqualifying traits 
of character – swindling, gambling, idleness, disorder – or attest to their fame, reputation, 
or credit, Tucker did not specify. It almost goes without saying that the growing 
                                                





population of free blacks in Virginia were universally excluded from all participation in 
civil society, jury service included, a view consistent with Tucker and Jefferson’s stated 
opinions on race. 
Tucker’s suspicion of such an expansive subset of the population meant that he 
was much friendlier to the still ubiquitous Blackstone’s Commentaries than Jefferson. 
The synthesis of English common law, first published some thirty-five years earlier, was 
still the standard reference for Virginia lawyers and educators at the time of the 
Jeffersonian Revolution. Julian Waterman offers that Jefferson found “little to praise in 
the political economy of Blackstone, the eulogist of an English society and government 
which had as its foundation the protection of the propertied class.”225  
Jefferson’s antagonism toward Blackstone stemmed from his hostility toward the 
common law itself, which he condemned as complicated, confusing, and ultimately 
ruinous to liberty. Jefferson believed the ancient Saxons had perfected law and liberty, 
and that their conquest and the subsequent centuries of piling on English common law 
tradition made the original, virtuous, law unintelligible. In winning the Revolution, 
Waterman contends, Jefferson believed the “American colonists had assumed the long 
lost rights of the Saxons” in a “victory in the war against the English king and his 
lawyers.”226  
As a legal revolution, American independence offered the unprecedented 
opportunity, in Jefferson’s view, to discard the unwieldy trappings of common law and 
return to the simple virtue of statute law – that is, written law dictated by the legislature 
instead of informally passed from judge to judge over generations. Statute law was 
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unchanging, in theory, where common law was constantly in motion, growing more 
complicated and cumbersome over time. To borrow the words of Bernard Schwartz, the 
Revolution promised to prove “statute law was the real law,” and that “the legislator not 
the judge was the true lawmaker.”227 
During the Revolution, Jefferson partnered with Wythe in an attempt to discard 
the existing English laws and create a definitive, original body of republican statutes to 
govern Virginia. St. George Tucker, on the other hand, boldly declared, “Great 
revolutions are too immense for technical formality.”228 Jefferson and Wythe’s bold 
experiment mostly failed. From their frustrating experience in legal-statesmanship, 
Jefferson and Wythe parted ways, methodologically speaking. Jefferson carried the 
Revolution’s optimistic spirit of reform with him to national governance, while Wythe 
moved from the college to the bench, where he never abandoned his belief in the 
transformative power of law, an ideology he applied liberally in his court.    
Some thirty years later, the legal culture’s continued dependence on Blackstone 
bothered Jefferson. Virginia law was still largely the “judge made” law of English 
tradition, and John Marshall’s elevation to the nation’s highest court threatened to corrupt 
the whole republic with this undesirable habit.  “Unwritten law,” Marshall said, “is really 
human reason applied by the courts, not capriciously, but in a regular train of decisions, 
to human affairs, for the promotion to the ends of justice.”229 This exposes a critical 
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ambiguity in the concept of republican law: balancing the adherence to precedent and 
science (uniformity) with the acknowledgment of the judges’ obligation to actively 
construct the law through their decisions (creating justice; the judge as a social engineer). 
George Wythe, as Virginia’s most independent jurist, embraced his role as 
judicial engineer, especially when slave freedom suits came before his court (as they 
often did). One of the first such significant cases involved the slaves of John Pleasants, 
Sr., a Virginia Quaker who died in 1771, stipulating in his will that his slaves be freed 
when they reached thirty years of age.230  
In the 1790s, the Pleasants slaves began to come of age, and the Pleasants heirs 
freed close to one hundred slaves in multiple counties around Richmond. John Pleasants’ 
son, Robert, actively opposed slavery in Virginia during this time, joining Virginia’s 
abolition society and corresponding with Thomas Jefferson and James Madison about the 
subject. Pleasants asked Madison, his Congressional representative in 1791, to sponsor a 
legislative condemnation of the African slave trade, which was constitutionally protected 
until 1808. Further, he expressed his strong desire to see Madison support a plan of 
gradual abolition in Virginia. “Seeing we live in an enlightened age,” Pleasants wrote to 
Madison in familiar language, “when liberty is alowed [sic] to be the unalianable right of 
all mankind, it surely behoves us of the present generation, and more especially the 
Legislature, to endeavour to restore one of the most valuable blessings of life, to an 
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injured and unhappy race of people.”231 Madison, in response, offered measured political 
justifications for his refusal to consider either suggestion. Regarding a public 
denunciation of the slave trade, Madison insisted he must defer to “those from whom I 
derive my public station.” To his slaveholding Virginia constituents, he “might be 
chargeable at least with want of candour, if not of fidelity, were I to make use of a 
situation in which their confidence has placed me, to become a volunteer in giving a 
public wound…to an interest on which they set so great a value.”232As for any plan for 
practical abolition in Virginia, Madison astutely warned that efforts to undermine slavery 
might do more harm than good, by arousing slaveholder’s fears and prompting political 
backlash. Madison predicted nervous slave owners might respond to perceived threats to 
their institution by revoking the legal right of manumission altogether.233  
 As a judge, St. George Tucker did not derive his public station from popular 
consent, so he possessed a bit more freedom to dissent from the majority opinion. Despite 
misgivings about its disruptive potential, Tucker reluctantly attached his name to Robert 
Pleasants’ abolition petition.234 Throughout the 1790s, Pleasants and Tucker exchanged 
correspondence as they attempted to legislate a solution to ending slavery in Virginia.  
 Five years after his exchange with Madison, Pleasants wrote to Jefferson to solicit 
support for educational reform to coincide with gradual abolition. Appealing to his 
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republican intellectual idealism, Pleasants reminded Jefferson that freedom, in “this 
enlightened day is generally acknowledged to be their right.”235 While the law did not 
recognize this enlightened viewpoint, Jefferson praised the Quaker’s efforts at providing 
for general public education, consistent as it was with his own view that enlightened 
learning, in any form, could only strengthen the republic, because “ignorance and 
despotism seem made for each other.”236 
 While Robert Pleasants actively campaigned for abolition, some of the Pleasants’ 
heirs refused to comply with the conditions of John Sr.’s 1771 will. Robert filed suit 
against them in 1798 in order to force them to free the remaining slaves. Because 
Robert’s legal action required the court to compel the enforcement of a will, it fell under 
the jurisdiction of George Wythe’s Chancery Court. As his counsel, Robert Pleasants 
obtained two talented attorneys, including John Marshall. Opposing Marshall was 
Edmund Randolph, his former Richmond law partner. Exiled from national politics since 
1795, and facing huge personal debts,237 Randolph comfortably returned to the life of a 
busy, professional Richmond lawyer, where his skill and prestige placed him in high 
demand. By the end of the 1790s, Randolph was appearing as primary or co-counsel in 
half of all the cases heard by Richmond’s Court of Appeals. The only attorney equally 
successful by volume was the popular New York expatriate John Wickham.238 In the 
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Pleasants case, Randolph and Wickham argued together against their friend and neighbor 
John Marshall. 
 Chancellor Wythe ruled in favor of John Marshall and Robert Pleasants, 
proclaiming the legality of their emancipation and taking the surprising step of awarding 
the slaves compensation for the time they had been illegally held in bondage.239 The 
opposing Pleasants heirs quickly appealed the case, and it was presented to the Court of 
Appeals in Richmond the following year. 
 Rather than relying on broad appeals to liberty or justice, Marshall attempted to 
define a practical boundary to the conflicted legal space between property rights and 
human rights that plagued the republican lawyers and judges. The defendants argued that 
because the law allowing emancipation was not passed until 1782, any slaves born 
between the time of the will and the emancipation law should not be subject to freedom. 
All things being equal, in terms of property law, the argument was sound. If the slaves 
had been livestock, tools, or other physical property, the statute was plain. Marshall’s 
argument insisted that the will granted some legal guarantee of freedom to persons even 
as they remained property, and acknowledged the overlapping legal concepts. His 
argument insisted that some legal distinction must exist between human property and 
inanimate property. The court partially agreed. The three judges of the appeals court, 
among them Wythe’s sometime ideological opponent Edmund Pendleton, upheld the 
legality of the emancipation but reversed Wythe’s award of damages.240 
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 When Robert Pleasants appealed to Madison for political assistance in effecting 
abolition, he wrote to him “believing thou art a friend to general liberty.”241 In 1791, 
Madison deemed his support politically impossible. In 1796, Pleasants believed Jefferson 
“to be a real friend to the cause of liberty,”242 and as far as education was concerned, 
Jefferson agreed. In 1798 and 1799, the responsibility fell on John Marshall to construct 
the legal foundation for a legal right to liberty for slaves, and Pleasants found a receptive 
audience in the George Wythe. Marshall even succeeded on appeal in the stricter legal 
environment of the Court of Appeals. By the end of 1799, Marshall left Richmond for a 
seat in the U.S. Congress at Philadelphia, and the four hundred Pleasants slaves began a 
life as free persons in republican Virginia.  
 Seven years later, Marshall was absent from the Virginia legal culture when 
Jackey Wright brought a pauper’s suit against Houlder Hudgins in the Chancery Court. 
Wright was a slave, though she appeared “perfectly white.”243 When Hudgins sold her to 
a slave trader, she sued. The 1806 case of Hudgins v. Wright once again brought Wythe’s 
revolutionary legal ideals into direct conflict with the higher court.  
 The outcome of the case rested on Wright’s assertion that she descended from a 
late seventeenth-century Virginia Indian named “Butterwood Nan.” By Virginia law, 
Indians could not be enslaved, and existing evidence sufficiently proved that Nan was 
born of an Indian father. Slave status, however, was matrilineal – passed from slave 
mother to children. The father’s race or status was irrelevant. Edmund Randolph led 
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Hudgins’ defense, claiming that Butterwood Nan’s mother had been a black slave, thus 
extinguishing all of her descendants’ legal claims to freedom. Neither the claimant 
Wright nor Randolph for the defense could prove the status of Nan’s mother, so Wright’s 
matrilineal status was legally indeterminate. In Wythe’s court, then, Jackey Wright’s 
freedom rested on the judge’s decision of which party possessed the burden of proof. If a 
slave were automatically a slave unless they could prove otherwise, Wright would remain 
in bondage. If a slave owner were obligated to conclusively defend their claim to 
ownership against any and all challenges, Wright would go free, and the legal foundation 
of the entire institution would be seriously compromised.  
 Chancellor Wythe ruled in favor of Jackey Wright, granting her freedom on the 
basis of her perfectly white appearance. “Whenever one person claims to hold another in 
slavery,” he announced, “the onus probandi [the burden of proof] lies on the claimant.”244  
 The broad reaching decision shocked the defense, but Wythe’s legal reasoning 
startled them even more. As his legal authority, Wythe did not claim a common law 
tradition or precedent, or even an abstract notion of justice, but rather the letter of 
republican statute, in the form of what he called Virginia’s “political catechism”245 - the 
Revolutionary era bill of rights. Wythe reminded the court that the republican ideals of 
the Revolution, codified by the legally binding bill of rights, clearly stated that “freedom 
is the birthright of every human being,”246 Anyone claiming the right to enslave another 
must prove their legal right to do so on an individual basis. He was not proclaiming the 
illegality or unconstitutionality of slavery, and in fact his decision acknowledged the 







established legal principle that only white men were entitled to republican liberty. 
Instead, he undermined the institution of slavery by placing the burden on free white 
republicans to prove that the men and women they enslaved were not white as well - a 
limited, but significant antislavery victory. 
 Unlike his extralegal “here is the limit of your authority” proclamation of 1787, 
Wythe’s 1806 Hudgins decision incorporated his personal claim to judicial authority into 
the legitimate point of law on which the case rested. As such, his claim that the 
Revolutionary rights of man trumped the rights of property became part of the precedent 
by which future judges would be bound to abide; that is, if the decision survived an 
appeal.  
 After his courtroom defeat in March of 1806, Edmund Randolph quickly appealed 
the Chancery Court’s decision and began preparing for an appearance before the Court of 
Appeals and its newest judge, St. George Tucker, at the end of the year. Two months 
later, the legal community and the whole nation were shocked by the sudden death of the 
eighty-year old Chancellor Wythe – not by natural causes, but by murder. Apparently 
poisoned by his shiftless teenage grandnephew George Wythe Sweeney, Wythe survived 
barely long enough to revise his will in order to disinherit his murderer. To assist him in 
his weakened state, Wythe called upon his friend and legal colleague Edmund 
Randolph.247 Wythe’s longtime housemate and cook, Lydia Broadnax, suffered the 
effects of the poison but recovered. His fifteen-year old free black protégé Michael 
Brown died.   
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 Before settling the Hudgins case at the November session of the Court of Appeals, 
Randolph found the time to participate in the most sensational trial of the year, the 
September indictment of George Wythe Sweeney for the chancellor’s murder. Randolph 
took on the surprising and thankless task of defending Sweeney, assisted by William 
Wirt, a relatively young lawyer. Originally from Maryland, Wirt was too young to be a 
revolutionary (he was born in 1772), and fancied himself as much a literary talent as a 
legal one. In 1803, he anonymously published a series of fictional foreign dispatches 
under the title Letters of the British Spy, describing the life and culture of Richmond. In 
it, he offered a satirical critique of the city’s most prominent lawyer, Edmund Randolph. 
“His mind,” wrote the titular spy, “as is often but not invariably the case, corresponds to 
his personal appearance: that is, that it is turned rather for ornament than for severe 
use.”248  
 Wirt was an outsider and a socially mobile upstart, whose journey more closely 
paralleled that of St. George Tucker than the aristocratic Randolph,249 but whatever their 
differences, they successfully defended George Wythe Sweeney in September of 1806. 
Sweeney’s acquittal resulted from the exclusion of the eyewitness testimony of his 
surviving victim; Lydia Broadnax’s race made her testimony inadmissible.  
 The following month, Randolph appeared before the appeals court to finally settle 
the Hudgins case. In his decision, St. George Tucker declared his firm loyalty to the 
precedence of property rights over human rights. In the Pleasants case, John Marshall 
had tried to combine the two concepts, arguing that the slaves’ humanity vested them 
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with some kind of legal identity beyond simple property, but not fully men (a concept he 
was able to elucidate from the Supreme Court bench in the Antelope case and Boyce v. 
Anderson).250 Tucker refuted this construction, stating in no uncertain terms that slave 
property warranted no special legal consideration in his court by virtue of their humanity. 
“In deciding upon the rights of property,” he wrote, “these rules which have been 
established are not to be departed from, because freedom is in question.”251 He upheld the 
legality of Wythe’s decision, but was careful to specify how his logic differed from 
Wythe’s. Wythe insisted that Jackie Wright was free because Virginia’s Bill of Rights 
declared all persons to be free unless proven otherwise. Tucker did not accept this notion 
of default freedom. Instead he allowed that Wright was free because she was acceptably 
white by his standards of evidence – in this case, the discretion of the judge. Virginia 
statute dictated, as Tucker reminded, that “all white persons are and ever have been free 
in this country.”252 An independent judge, in Tucker’s view, could evaluate the evidence 
and determine an individual’s race. Wythe’s interpretation of his own latitude to interpret 
the meaning of the Bill of Rights, however, was overstepping his judicial prerogative. 
“The Bill of Rights,” Tucker insisted, “was meant to embrace the cause of free citizens… 
and not by a side wind overturn the rights of property.”253 
 Throughout his life, John Marshall displayed the typically ambivalent Virginian 
attitude toward slavery and unwillingness to engage in any substantive effort to end it 
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from economic and political necessity. Clearly, the Virginia legislature was too 
conservative to act. In light of their refusal, George Wythe felt an obligation to correct 
the injustice and believed it within his authority to do so.  
 Recalling the infamous witch trials of Salem, John Marshall warned of “the 
degree of depravity always to be counted on when the public passions countenance 
crime.”254 Where the Virginian majority perpetuated its own depravity on a scale far 
beyond Salem, Wythe concluded that a strict textual application of Virginia’s 
Revolutionary statute could counter the criminal impulses of the public will. Chief Justice 
Marshall suggested the survival of this conception of republican law when he wrote in 
1813, “an act ought to be so construed as to avoid gross injustice if such construction be 
compatible with the words of the law.”255 In his own decisions, however, Marshall 
consistently erred on the side of protecting property rights, even while acknowledging the 
injustice he was facilitating.   
 Like Marshall, Tucker relished his judicial authority but in the case of slavery, 
couched it in a democratic deference to the legislature. In the Hudgins case, he reminded 
the court that the Virginia Bill of Rights was deliberately framed to exclude slaves.256 
Wythe’s attempt to enforce natural rights, though compatible with the words of the law, 
subverted its obvious intention. Marshall, for his part, conceded that “where great 
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inconvenience would result from a particular construction, that construction is to be 
avoided, unless,” he qualified, “the meaning of the legislature is plain.”257 The legal 
theory expressed by this rhetorical construction allowed Marshall to resign himself to his 
inability to address the slavery issue in any substantive way by conceding that his belief 
that an individual judge's personal aversion to slavery could not overcome its sanction by 
statute, common law, and legislature alike.  
Marshall’s judicial career, however, clearly demonstrates that when his personal 
conviction was attached, his talent at interpreting ‘the words of law’ to suit what he 
deemed the best interests of the republic was unparalleled. In McCullogh v. Maryland in 
1819, he famously determined the statutory limitation of the federal government to 
“necessary and proper” tasks was sufficiently ambiguous as to allow the court to interpret 
its meaning. When the state of Georgia claimed sovereignty over federally protected 
Cherokee Indians within their borders, Marshall allowed himself the latitude to prevent 
the injustice of their removal. Granting the Cherokees their federally dependent 
sovereignty was not specified, but constructed, by the chief justice as compatible with the 
words of the law.  
An indistinct idea of “republicanism” was the guiding force for Virginia’s early 
legal culture, but slavery distorted some its keys principles, strongly suggesting that 
republicanism simply could not work in Virginia. The benefit of open public forums, able 
to produce rational decisions based on all available information, was impossible. Slaves 
often possessed crucial information but were rendered silent. A disinterested meritocracy 
could not replace the hereditary aristocracy, as the slave system continually perpetuated 
                                                




the dependence of the lower classes. This likewise rendered impossible the assembling of 
neutral, dispassionate juries. And genuine fairness – a true sense of justice as the purpose 
of law – could not prevail in a legal setting where property rights always trumped natural 
rights.  
Marshall carried some of this frustrating ambiguity to his career in the federal 
court. His tendency to appoint himself the translator of the “spirit of the law” aligned, in 
theory, with Wythe’s concept of the role of judge as enlightened arbiter. In terms of 
slavery, of course, their paths could not have differed more. Marshall’s conception of 
judicial independence was in line with Wythe and Tucker as well, though his 
jurisprudence weighted the balance of power toward federal rather than state sovereignty 
and judicial over legislative authority. Marshall’s position as a federal rather than a state 
judge widened his separation from the Virginian perspective, where judicial 
independence meant something entirely different. 
Marshall’s views on the executive were likewise unusual in Virginia, a distinction 
born of his service outside the state during the American Revolution. There, he served 
with “great men” - often fellow Virginians - but their shared wartime suffering at the 
hands of an inattentive and weak federal compact of states forever cured them of the local 
tendency to fear centralization.  
Marshall’s career path eventually took him away from Virginia’s courts, where 
others, still engulfed by the culture whose addiction to slavery choked the republican 
values they espoused, continued to champion the sort of weak compact government 




Caroline, with support from Jefferson and legal justification from Tucker, grew 
increasingly vocal in their denunciation of the power structure Marshall was fashioning. 
When their rhetoric gained traction, Marshall anonymously combatted them in public 
newspaper exchanges, but his break with Virginia was complete. His authoritative 
position on the federal court could not sway the culture he had left behind.  
At the federal level, Marshall chose his battles carefully, and framed his 
opposition with a skillful regard for the fragile state of the ongoing republican 
experiment. For him, federal supremacy meant the survival of virtue in the face of 
increasing democratic assault from below, and his constitutional cases reflect a hope for 
stabilizing the rule of law made possible by the Revolution’s elevation of great men. That 
concern for maintaining stability into the next generation meant that protecting the union 
was worth the risk, but breaking it up over slavery was not. Though no longer a cultural 
Virginian, slavery posed the same threat to Marshall’s vision of the republic that it did to 
his ideological opponents.  
Marshall did not anticipate the gradual marriage of the unresolved antifederalist 
claims to state sovereignty with the southern addiction to slavery. He casually deflected it 
in the one instance it appeared before his court (and joked to Justice Story that bothering 
to address it would constitute “butting a wall in sport”). During Marshall’s tenure on the 
court, states’ rights theory matured, then evolved into a purely southern phenomenon. At 
the same time, the momentum of abolitionist sentiment provoked increasingly committed 
counterattacks from slaveholders across the south. In the face of these combined forces, 
Marshall desperately clung to his position on the Supreme Court even as his health failed 




“The case of the south seems to me to be desperate,” he distressed near the end of 
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 Epilogue: “Will you draw down this curse upon Virginia?” 
 
 Soon after Virginia ratified a state constitution in 1776, Thomas Jefferson warned 
that its “capital defects” created an urgent and perilous situation.259 Jefferson urged his 
countrymen “to be sensible of it, and…apply at a proper season the proper remedy; which 
is a convention to fix the constitution, amend its defects.”260 
 Fifty years later, Jefferson died in Virginia, and his state’s constitution was 
unchanged. St. George Tucker died the next year, in 1827, leaving behind an earnest 
argument against the republican legitimacy of slavery, but a firm judicial confirmation of 
its legality. Tucker also left behind a carefully crafted legal defense of what came to be 
known as the “compact theory” of state sovereignty in his edition of Blackstone’s 
Commentaries. Jefferson argued in the Virginia and Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 and 
1799 that the states retained their ultimate sovereign authority when they entered into the 
federal union. Tucker backed up this political argument with legal reasoning in 1803, 
insisting that “a law is not binding upon posterity, merely because it was made by their 
ancestors; but, because posterity have not repealed it.”261  
In other words, succeeding generations of republican lawyers and statesmen 
possessed the authority to revisit and revise the nature of their laws, even the Constitution 
– the fundamental law of the land. Jefferson entreated republicans to “get rid of the magic 
supposed to be in the word constitution.”262 The existing legislature, he argued, had no 
authority to create a body of law above the authority of future legislatures. This, he 
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insisted, was a legal fiction. Thus, a constitution’s authority was dependent upon the 
continued consent of the people, whose will was expressed by their representatives. St. 
George Tucker agreed, and specified that the acceptance of the constitution was not just 
an act of the legislature, but of the people themselves, acting in “their sovereign character 
and capacity.” In this sense, the “assent of the people was indispensably necessary to the 
validity of the compact.”263 
John Marshall’s interpretation of this same republican concept – the sovereignty 
of the people – led him to a different conclusion, namely that popular sovereignty could 
be somehow divorced from the popular will.264 In McCullogh v. Maryland in 1819, 
Marshall famously declared, “it is a constitution we are expounding... intended to endure 
for ages to come, and consequently to be adapted to the various crises of human 
affairs.”265 In other words, the Constitution (and, it follows, the judges who held the 
responsibility to apply it) was, by definition, removed from direct accountability to 
popular control. The necessity to separate the democratic impulse from constitutional law 
is analogous to Marshall’s genuine belief that he could separate the court from politics. 
The failure of both attempts became evident when Andrew Jackson won the presidency 
in 1828. Claiming the popular mandate of the common man, he threatened to undue all of 
Marshall’s careful efforts at building the elevated authority of the court as the arbiter of 
Constitutional law.  
 At the time of Jackson’s election, Thomas Jefferson had been dead for two years, 
and St. George Tucker for one. Edmund Randolph had died some fifteen years earlier, 
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and George Wythe another seven years before that.  Of Virginia’s Revolutionary era 
lawyers, few remained. Marshall was nearly seventy-four years old, and his health was 
declining. The Federalists had long ceased to exist as a political party, though Marshall’s 
essential views had not changed. He was a partisan without a party. 
Marshall determined to remain on the Supreme Court in light of the 1828 election 
for much the same reason that compelled him to first accept the position in 1800 – to 
protect his political vision from a president who claimed a popular mandate.  But this 
time, the threat was more urgent. As a fellow Virginian of the Revolutionary era, 
Jefferson could at least be trusted to approach their political battles with a common 
concern for the fragility of the Union. Jackson could not be counted on to exercise the 
same discretion.  
  On March 4, 1829, Chief Justice Marshall administered the oath of office to 
Andrew Jackson, as he had for four other presidents. For twenty-five years, Marshall had 
abstained from voting in presidential elections, as part of his public effort to claim the 
court’s disinterest in political affairs. Marshall finally broke his own rule in order to cast 
a vote against Andrew Jackson for President – a fact that was made public during the 
campaign.266 
 The same day Marshall swore in President Jackson, he was summoned to 
Virginia, where delegates were being selected to attend a convention for the purpose of 
revising the state’s 1776 constitution.267  Some fifty years since Jefferson first warned of 
the urgent deficiencies of Virginia’s constitution, and forty-two years since Edmund 
Randolph told the Philadelphia Convention “none of the state constitutions have provided 
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a sufficient check against… democracy,”268 Virginia was, by many estimations, the least 
democratic state in the union.269 It was, for example, the last state mandating a minimum 
property requirement for voting. The national trend of Jacksonian democracy and the 
burgeoning population in Virginia’s mountainous western region – where slavery did not 
flourish and the lower classes did not own land – created a strong public outcry for 
universal white male suffrage. The Tidewater elite of the east were no longer the majority 
in Virginia, but a half-century old constitution guaranteed their political dominance 
through property requirements and the additional representation allotted to them by virtue 
of their extensive slave holdings. 
 James Monroe emerged from a comfortable retirement to attend the convention, 
as did a visibly feeble and trembling James Madison.270 The trio of Madison, Marshall, 
and Monroe was symbolic – their presence would allow the new generation of Virginian 
politicians to claim the authority that only the support of the founders could confer. It was 
also the last chance for the survivors of the republican generation to protect their 
“country” – Virginia – from the dangerous national trend of Jacksonian democracy. 
 It is easy to forget that Marshall, who had long abandoned local politics in favor 
of building the authority of the federal court, was still connected to his home state. He 
never stopped living in the home he built in Richmond in the heyday of his legal career 
between 1788 and 1790. And when he was not attending the brief sessions of the 
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Supreme Court in the nearby federal city of Washington, he traveled Virginia and North 
Carolina as a circuit court judge.271 His willingness to attend the convention to revise the 
constitution and the attitudes he expressed there prove that Marshall still possessed, as 
George Cabot chided when he first entered national politics in 1799, “the faults of a 
Virginian.” He meant that Marshall gave precedent to his home state and expected the 
world to be governed by his own brand of logic.  
 When the convention assembled, Madison maintained a minimal presence.272 
Marshall attended every meeting and served on key committees that reflected his most 
urgent concerns.273 The main sources of contention in the Virginian constitution were 
suffrage and representation. The tide of Jacksonian democracy suggested that western 
Virginians, despite having little property or slaves, had equal claim to participation in 
government.   
 The so-called “frontier” upbringing emphasized by so many Marshall biographers 
had much more in common with Jefferson and Madison’s piedmont aristocracy that it did 
with the immigrants and lower-class white men of the mountains of what is now West 
Virginia. Marshall had a genuine rustic appearance, but he owned slaves and hundreds of 
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thousands of acres of valuable land, and he feared as much as the Tidewater’s planter-
statesmen the corrosive effects of allowing people with no permanent republican 
connection to their community to rule. Furthermore, the legitimacy of proper republicans 
was based in disinterest – the independence to serve as a volunteer and not as a dependent 
partisan. Expanding the privileges of republican citizenship to everyone threatened to 
make the interested and dependent class a legislative majority, in which case republican 
virtue, as the surviving founders understood it, could not possibly survive.274  
Marshall, despite the weariness of his seventy-five years, was animated in his 
defense of the traditional legacy of government and law in his home state. When the 
convention addressed the question of restructuring the county courts along more purely 
democratic lines, Marshall responded with an impassioned plea in their defense. Bernard 
Schwartz notes that across the nation, the Jacksonian era brought the legal culture full 
circle, back to the colonial days when law was suspicious – a barely tolerated necessity. 
The egalitarian cast that Jackson's election promised, and what Alexis de Tocqueville 
claimed as America's distinguishing feature, garnered support for leveling the power of 
the courts, as well.275  
In defense of the county court system – largely unchanged since the colonial era – 
Marshall expressed an emotional exhortation that is remarkably uncharacteristic of the 
man who spent his whole life cultivating a public aura of disinterested objectivity, even 
in intensely political debates. But the threat that the judiciary might become subject to 
serve at the discretion of the legislature prompted Marshall to exclaim, “I have always 
                                                
274 McCoy says that “Madison’s ultimate fear was that of a society in which ‘this 
unfavoured class of the community’ would actually constitute a majority of the 
population.” Last of the Fathers, 192-193.  




thought, from my earliest youth till now, that the greatest scourge an angry Heaven ever 
inflicted upon an ungrateful and a sinning people, was an ignorant, a corrupt, or a 
dependent Judiciary. Will you draw down this curse upon Virginia?”276 If the age old 
system of gentleman-justices was more ignorant than Marshall would like to admit, he at 
least believed that their social status elevated them above the temptation to be corrupt and 
encouraged the republican value of independence.  
Ultimately, the convention left the old county courts to function as they always 
had. They also maintained a property requirement for voting and allowed the 
slaveholding eastern gentry to maintain their dominance over Virginia politics. The result 
was a sectional divide along east/west lines that mirrored the national divide over the 
same issues in the antebellum period. Just like Americans in the northern states, 
Virginians in the west grew increasingly frustrated over the ability of a minority of 
slaveholders to dominate the political discourse. More than twenty years later, in 1851, 
Virginia finally adopted democratic reforms on par with the rest of the nation in a new 
constitutional convention, but the issues of representation, suffrage, and the divide over 
slavery were not conclusively settled until the western portion of the state seceded, 
creating the separate state of West Virginia, in the midst of the Civil War in 1863.   
The convention of 1829-1830 marked the final effort of the last founders to secure 
their vision of republicanism in their home. James Monroe died a year after the 
convention concluded, while Madison – “the last of the fathers,” lingered for five more 
years. Drew McCoy, in his examination of Madison’s retirement years, paints a picture of 
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a disillusioned statesman who lived to see his republican dream slip away. John Marshall, 
in a sense, faced an even more frustrating dilemma. As the last of the founding generation 
to cling to an active position in national politics, the burden of defending the legacy of 
the Revolution fell squarely on his shoulders even as it proved increasingly impossible to 
protect. Madison, in retirement, could devote his time to instilling values in a younger 
generation of would-be republicans,277 but Marshall had to contend with Jackson’s efforts 
on a practical basis every day until the end of his life. His commitment to his legal and 
political vision and his fear of democracy never allowed him to retire.  
In the nullification crisis of 1832, Marshall found an unlikely ally for federal 
supremacy in President Jackson, who denied the right of South Carolina to determine the 
constitutionality of a federal tariff. At the same moment, however, Jackson provided 
national assistance to the state of Georgia, based on its own claims of sovereignty, to 
remove the Cherokee Indians from within their borders despite a ruling by the Marshall 
Court that federal Indian treaties superseded state prerogative. Georgia’s defiance 
illustrated, in an alarmingly concrete manner, that the judicial supremacy Marshall had 
spent a lifetime carefully cultivating might prove an idle illusion if the president openly 
defied it. Jefferson had never done so, and Marshall had always framed his decisions in 
such as way as not to provoke such outright defiance. But if, in the case of Jackson, the 
President were not guided by the shared principles of the Revolutionary era, the whole 
system might collapse.  
 John Marshall died on July 6, 1835, during Andrew Jackson’s second term. Like 
Madison, he despaired for the fate of the republic in his final years. Marshall located the 
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failure of the republican experiment in the issue of sovereignty. Virginia’s own compact 
theory, South Carolina’s flirtation with nullification, and Jackson’s tacit support for 
Georgia’s circumvention of the Supreme Court, all defied Marshall’s hopes for the 
survival of the republic. Of this belief, Marshall said in 1833, just two years before his 
death, “The time is arrived when these truths must be more generally spoken, or our 
Union is at and end. The idea of complete sovereignty of the State converts our 
Government into league, and, if carried into practice, dissolves the Union.”278  
In final analysis, McCoy concluded the dilemma of slavery undid Madison.”279 If 
Madison could marvel at the compromise that forged the Constitution and created the 
union, and could find reason to be hopeful that republican political economy would 
continue to adapt to a modern world, slavery proved to be a source of either despair or 
delusion. Ultimately, McCoy determined that the success of the Constitution and the 
continued survival of the union depended on the federal government remaining inactive 
on the slavery issue. He traced, through Madison's life, the “compromises” that amounted 
really to postponing the inevitable conflict. McCoy's emphasis on Madison's misplaced 
determination to support colonization is particularly effective – and Marshall supported 
this effort with as much enthusiasm. St. George Tucker, on the other hand, determined as 
early as 1796 that colonization was a pipe dream – mathematically and economically 
impossible.280   
 Not long after the conclusion of Virginia’s constitutional convention, Nat 
Turner’s 1832 slave rebellion sent shockwaves through every level of Virginia society. 
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Virginians had long ignored St. George Tucker’s warning that the republican 
contradiction of slavery, if ignored, would tear up the roots of civil society. Rather than 
acknowledge the contradiction in order to address it, Virginians increasingly resorted to 
the rhetoric of slavery as a positive good. If they could not solve the dilemma, they would 
deny it existed. After the deaths of Madison and Marshall less than a year apart in 1835 
and 1836, the issues of slavery defense and states’ rights became gradually inseparable, 
and when they combined, they undid the union.   
  Richard Ellis refers to the years from 1776 to 1815 as a time of remarkable unity 
in republican legal culture. 281 The survival of John Marshall into the next generation of 
law and politics underscores the conclusion that he and Jefferson had more in common 
than most historians and especially they themselves would have been willing to admit.282 
But by the 1830s, the insistence on democratic reform of the Virginia constitution and the 
presidency of Andrew Jackson proved that the Virginian concept of justice had shifted, 
and that John Marshall, the last republican of the Virginia dynasty of leadership, had 
postponed but not prevented the transition from republic to democracy. He worried that 
the union had been preserved “thus far by miracles,” and he feared that the ability to 
fashion those miracles would die with the founding generation.  
John Marshall died in the city where he first found a home in national politics – 
Philadelphia. It was during the first week of July, in 1835. Almost precisely twenty-eight 
years later, in the first week of July 1863, James K. Marshall marched onto the field of 
battle at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania. What Madison and Marshall had feared was now a 
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reality. The nation had split along sectional lines over the intertwined issues of slavery 
and sovereignty in 1861, and just two weeks before the Gettysburg battle, so had the 
commonwealth of Virginia. The new state of West Virginia was admitted to the Union on 
June 20th. On July 3rd, the twenty-four year old grandson of the Great Chief Justice led a 
regiment of Confederates in Pickett’s Charge. Looking to a fellow officer, James 
Marshall remarked, “we do not know which of us will be the next to fall,” and within 
minutes, he was felled by enemy fire while rallying his soldiers to make the impossible 
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